HENRY KISSINGER'IN 1973 ARAP-İSRAİL SAVAŞI ESNASINDAKİ DIŞ POLİTİKA SÖYLEMİNDE ORYANTALİZM[*]

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Öz

Bu makale, Henry Kissinger'ın 1973 Arap-İsrail Savaşı sırasındaki dış politika söylemini eleştirel bir söylem analizi üzerinden incelemektedir. Makalenin ana teması, 1973'teki bu olay sırasında ABD dış politikasında bir karar verici olarak Henry Kissinger'ın Oryantalist anlayışlara sahip olup olmadığıdır. Kuramsal bir çerçeve sağlamak amacıyla, birinci ve ikinci bölümlerde Eleştirel Söylem Analizi ve Edward Said'in Oryantalizm tanımı ele alınmıştır. Son bölümde ise 1973 Arap-İsrail Savaşı sırasında ABD dış politikasının yürütülmesinde ana figür olan Henry Kissinger'ın dillendirmediği fikirlerini ortaya çıkarmak amacıyla eleştirel söylem analizi kullanılmıştır. Bu amaçla ilgili dönemde ABD dış politika kararlarına ilişkin politika belgeleri, görüşme muhtıraları, telefon görüşmelerinin tutanakları, toplantı tutanakları ve anekdotlar gibi resmî tarihi belgelerden yararlanılmıştır 1973 Arap-İsrail Savaşı ortaya çıkarken karar alma süreçlerinde aşağılayıcı terimlerin, insandışılaştırmanın ve yanlış hesaplamaların Henry Kissinger ile var olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Böylelikle Kissinger'ın, Edward Said'in Oryantalizm kavramına uyan önyargılı fikirlere sahip olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Henry Kissinger, Oryantalizm, Dış Politika Söylemi, 1973 Arap-İsrail Savaşı
JEL Kodları: F50, F35

ORIENTALISM IN HENRY KISSINGER'S FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSE DURING THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

Abstract

This article examines Henry Kissinger's foreign policy discourse during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War through a Critical Discourse Analysis. The central theme of the article is whether Henry Kissinger had Orientalist conceptions as a decision maker in U.S. foreign policy during this event in 1973. In order to provide a theoretical framework, Critical Discourse Analysis and Edward Said's definition of Orientalism are discussed in the first and second parts. In the last part, a Critical Discourse Analysis is utilized to uncover the ideas that Henry Kissinger, who was the main figure in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, has not expressed openly. For this purpose, official historical documents such as policy documents, memorandum of conversations, transcripts of telephone calls, meeting minutes and anecdotes regarding U.S. foreign policy decisions in the relevant period are used. As the 1973 Arab-Israeli War emerged, derogatory terms, acts of dehumanization and miscalculations are found to exist with Henry Kissinger in the decision-making processes. Thus, it is concluded that Kissinger had indeed preconceived ideas that fit Edward Said's concept of Orientalism.

Keywords: Henry Kissinger, Orientalism, Foreign Policy Discourse, 1973 Arab-Israeli War
JEL Codes: F50, F35

INTRODUCTION

In 1973 and the years that followed, Henry Kissinger was the protagonist of U.S. foreign policy formulation and execution. Just before the outbreak of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, in addition to the prominent position of President Nixon's national security advisor, Kissinger was also appointed as the Secretary of State. Amidst the Watergate scandal and his position within the Nixon administration, Kissinger grasped and clinched to power by monitoring and guiding every foreign policy decision.

Kissinger was involved in countless endeavors that constituted of conferences, telephone diplomacy, and both official and unofficial international visits between the actors of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. As the secretary of state in the Nixon administration, Kissinger spent a substantial amount of his time in the Middle East to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute. In addition, it was at this time in which his identity became a focal point of Arab leaders, U.S. officials, and even American and Israeli Jews. Even President Nixon suggested that Kissinger might give Israel preferential treatment due to his background (Ribak, 2010).

The aim of this article is to explore, through a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), whether factors other than existing explanations had played a role in U.S. policy decision-making during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. However, this article does not attempt to refute existing explanations for Kissinger's policy decisions during the two events that are central in this research. On the contrary, it aims to add a different explanation for existing analyses regarding Kissinger and his decisions during these events. This study mainly claims that the Cold War was not the only leading force in Kissinger's policy decisions. The prospect of Soviet expansionism was only one factor at play. Power politics, preconceived ideas and stereotyping also played a role in Kissinger's decision-making processes. Orientalist notions are indeed evident in Henry Kissinger's foreign policy decision-making practices towards the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. 425 official historical documents from *the Foreign Relations of the United States:1969-1976, Volume XXV: Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973* series were examined in relation to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.

CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Discourses can be regarded as an asset which manufactures and promotes a certain image of the world. They do not display the authenticity of the world in its natural form. On the contrary, discourses assist, or reinforce, the processes of creating a particular understanding of the world in the minds of its residents (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). This creation process is relevant to many aspects of the world, including foreign policy. From this perspective, having the capacity to construct the social world is an inherent characteristic of discourses.

This interpretation of discourse draws upon the poststructuralist Foucauldian interpretation of discourse. The Foucauldian interpretation asserts that discourses create a limited range of possible statements, which in turn promote a limited range of meanings and understandings (Larsen, 2013). Discourses establish a social world through the creation of certain forms of knowledge, identities and social relations. Thus, through a discourse analysis, language is approached as a means by which a reality is constructed. However, depending on the background and the purpose of a study, the methods of discourse analysis will differ. For instance, a CDA methodology, which will be elaborated on further below, will be used in this study to examine the usage of language (written and spoken) of a particular person.

Dijk (2015) indicates that CDA is a form of discourse analysis that mainly studies social dominance and inequality. This is achieved by analyzing speech acts on a particular topic in the social and political context in which these speech acts are produced, distributed and consumed. By integrating the speech act with the context in which this speech act occurred within the analysis, a CDA can be used to examine how a speech act has confirmed, legitimized and replicated power relations and dominance. Likewise, Fairclough and Wodak have made a suitable explanation of the implications that speech acts may have:

Discursive practices may have major ideological effects – that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and position people. (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997, p. 258)

In this context, a CDA can be applied to bring cases of social inequality to light. By means of a CDA, speech acts are not only described, but also explained and interpreted with regard to the social and political context (Dijk, 1999). Therefore, the CDA methodology can be favorable in the interpretation of foreign policy decisions coming from a specific personality, which is also the aim of this research.

However, while a historian may have thousands of archival records available for its interpretative research, the exploration of underlying beliefs that leaders or foreign policy elites may have can be an exhausting one due to scarcely available information and limited inside access to the processes of their foreign policy decision-making (Broad and Daddow, 2010). Despite this obstacle, it is possible to access this enclosed circle of foreign policy making. As this research will take advantage of, published data in relation to the actors, along with their roles in the formulation of foreign policies, provides for an opportunity to access this enclosed circle from which a researcher may catch a glance of the processes of foreign policy making by elites. The existence of published data by the Office of the Historian in the U.S. Department of State, which is a book series named Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), constitutes this

opportunity from which an interpretation of Henry Kissinger and his policies towards the 1973 Arab-Israeli War is made possible for this study.

To clarify, The FRUS presents the official documentary history of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and important diplomatic activities. It includes textual footprints such as policy documents, memorandum of conversations, transcripts of telephone calls, meeting minutes and anecdotes regarding U.S. foreign policy decisions. As Broad and Daddow (2010) point out, these kind of identified textual footprints leave traces of motives that will shed light on core elements of the worldview of foreign policy decision-makers. Therefore, a CDA methodology will be used to investigate these traces in order to clarify how speech acts have created, confirmed and legitimized the foreign policy of Henry Kissinger towards the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In addition, other textual footprints, such as biographical sources, will be taken advantage of as supplementary sources.

This study benefits from the ideological discourse approach within CDA, an approach which was mainly advanced by Teun van Dijk. As the name implies, this approach is closely linked to ideology. It is feasible to conclude that ideological principles are contained in all discourses, whether spoken or written. In support, Fowler claims that "everything stated or written about the world is articulated from a certain ideological standpoint" (as cited in Ghaderinezhad, 2016, p. 881). Similarly, according to Dijk (2006, p. 733), "text or talk show ideologies discursively" and thus make the link between language and ideology visible. Furthermore, Dijk (2006, p. 734) asserts that "ideologies often have a polarized structure reflecting competing or conflicting group membership and categorization in in-groups and out-groups" that tries to stress the positive aspects of "us" and the negative aspects of "them." Positive self-representation and negative other-representation are the key strategies employed here. As a result, the claim is that ideologies that hold preconceived concepts may likewise produce preconceived discourses.

Generalizations, norm expressions, implications, irony, metaphors, comparisons and polarizations are some of the categories that are used in ideological discourse analysis (Dijk, 2006). This article looks at Henry Kissinger's speech acts to identify whether these categories were present in his decision-making processes towards the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Close attention will be paid to the possible existence of metaphors, misconceptions, and preconceived ideas in Kissinger's speech acts.

ORIENTALISM BY EDWARD SAID

Palestinian-American scholar and political activist Edward Said has spoken in controversial ways about the studies of the Orient (now known as Middle Eastern studies) and Western science in his groundbreaking book Orientalism of which the first edition was published in 1978. The literary critic

examined literature in the light of social and cultural politics and was an outspoken advocate for the creation of an independent Palestinian state. In addition, his view of the Middle East has strongly influenced its study and to this day, his name is an established concept in Middle Eastern studies.

Initially, Orientalism was defined as the scientific study of the "Orient". However, Edward Said adopted a different definition of Orientalism in his work. With his book Orientalism, Said brought attention to the Western representation of the East. According to Said, the term "Orientalism" does not only refer to the academic discipline that studies the East. The term also refers to a Western view of the East which is fundamentally "different" from the West. This difference came into being through certain ways of speaking, thinking and writing about the East. As a result, the West created a "contrasting image" of itself that became to function as an instrument to identify its own "idea, personality and experience" (Said, 2003, p. 2).

Said (2003) describes the concept of Orientalism as the difference between the East and the West, or in other terms, the difference between the "civilized" and the "uncivilized" world. Within this concept, portrayals of the West are progressive, rational, mature and normal; while the East is portrayed as regressive, irrational, immature and different. By doing so, Orientalist works have acted as self-fulfilling prophecies. Stereotypical statements and works regarding the Orient that have been continuously repeated in the same manner developed into the absolute truth for the Orientalist. It is therefore impossible to approach the Orient from an immaculate thought. As Said (2003, p. 202) points out, "Orientalism can thus be regarded as a manner of regularized (or Orientalized) writing, vision, and study, dominated by imperatives, perspectives, and ideological biases ostensibly suited to the Orient."

> *Orientalism, although that this work is not unquestioned to this day, has had a major influence on the status and prominence of the cultural sciences. Having studied a large amount of scientific, literary and political texts, Said comes to a scathing judgment. In his opinion, all these texts would say something more about colonial prejudices of the authors than about reality, which according to Said would be much more dynamic, complex, multifaceted and inclusive than the usually accepted image in the West (Said, 2003). In fact, he argues that the "Orient", as a demarcated area, is only a Western construction intended to distinguish the West as a separate and a superior entity. That way, a certain image of "we" against "them" would be confirmed (Said, 2003).*

In Orientalism, Said actually deconstructs the title of his book. He believes that non-Western countries (and especially the Arab-Islamic culture and people) have been observed and described for centuries with a Euro-centrist view. This is said to stem from a long tradition of the West romanticizing the "East" and projecting its prejudices on it. For instance, "the other" (the Arab and the Muslim) is contrasted with the

Westerner, by accentuating differences in order to emphasize their own superiority. This was done under the guise of scientific study, but actually has been a political move according to Said (Cristante, 2016).

Said believes that Orientalism could thus also serve as an instrument to justify colonialism and imperialism - the Western domination of other peoples. He supposes that the West has been engaged in this stereotyping since ancient times while art and literature have for centuries portrayed the East as feminine, exotic, weak and irrational against the strong, rational and masculine West that has been given the task to bring civilization to the East (Said, 2003). Since Western scholars have written the history of the East, Europe has become, according to Said, the norm against which the rest of the world is compared with. In similar fashion, İbrahim Kalın (2018) asserts that:

> *The modern West's perception of the "other" and its understanding of the physicalist universe allowed it to define the "white man's burden" as its "civilizing mission". The colonial relationship of the West with the Islamic world developed in this way. Today, we continue to see the effects of this colonial relationship in many areas from popular culture to economic globalization. (Kalın, 2018, p. 33)*

Said wrote his book when the 1973 Arab-Israeli War (war between Israel, Egypt and Syria) had only just ended. In his book, he argued that Western academics and media were also clearly influenced by Orientalism during and towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As a result, there was fierce criticism of the book from the West. Said is said to have been incomplete and not done enough historical research to substantiate his claims (as cited in Güven, 2019). In similar fashion, non-Western historians criticized Said by stating that he actually contributed to Orientalism by portraying the East as passive and dependent on the West (Hafez, 2004).

In this work, Edward Said devotes several pages to Henry Kissinger and points out that Kissinger divided the world using loaded terms and jargon of a colonizer: he makes a classification of societies that find themselves in the pre-Newtonian and post-Newtonian stages. In other words, according to Said (2003, p. 46-48), Kissinger believed that societies that have not seen a "Newtonian revolution" are automatically not civilized.

The ideas conveyed by Edward Said in his book Orientalism, which was published 5 years after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and the role that Henry Kissinger, often described as a controversial, power-hungry and extremely complex man, had played during these events are the cornerstones of this article. The fact that Said cites Kissinger in his work and concludes that he uses binary-opposition to create an "other" makes it intriguing to examine whether Kissinger had Orientalist prejudices in both personal and professional areas

that may have shaped his decisions towards the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. However, it is important to be cognizant of other factors, such as the Cold War, that have undoubtedly played a role in drawing up his policies. It is crucial to study these two occurrences with the above in mind.

KISSINGER'S FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSE DURING 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

From the late 1960s through the late 1970s, U.S. foreign policy was defined by detente. This was a period of relaxation in the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States with the goal to avoid a disastrous conflict and establishing constructive relations between the two superpowers. The formation of numerous agreements between the two nations, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in the 1970s and the Helsinki Accords in 1975 reflected this detente period. It was during this period of detente that the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 took place.

The relevance of the detente period and Cold War rivalry for the United States are observable in the discussions that took place during the 1973 war. However, other viewpoints can lead to fresh discoveries. While the threat of Soviet expansionism undoubtedly affected U.S. foreign policy, primary sources that are related with U.S. foreign policy-making in 1973 reveal notable Orientalist elements.

Kissinger had played no part in the U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East policy during his initial time as national security adviser. President Nixon thought Kissinger would not be credible, given his background (Suri, 2008). As for President Nixon, the Arab-Israeli conflict was the main topic of his foreign policy when he became president. Secretary of State William Rogers was given the task to develop and implement a Middle East policy. As a result, the Rogers Plan was developed. This plan consisted of a series of peace initiatives and was based upon Israel's surrender of occupied territories which it gained during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War in exchange for peace in the region (Blanga, 2018).

The United States intended to follow a satisfactory foreign policy for both sides of the conflict and based its plan upon UNSC Resolution 242. William Rogers, first stated that he would push the Arab side to accept a lasting peace based on a legally enforceable accord. Second, he would call for Israelis to leave the occupied areas, and third, he would work to establish a solution for Palestinian refugees (Blanga, 2018, p. 988-991).

Kissinger was a fierce opponent of this plan and by deliberately slowing down the process to implement the plan, Kissinger had obstructed it (Blanga, 2018). This peace-for-land proposal was deemed undesirable by both Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and the Israeli lobby in the United States. Kissinger had warned the president that the Rogers Plan "cannot produce a solution without massive pressure on Israel.

It is more than likely going to wind up antagonizing both sides. It may produce a war" (Kissinger, 2011, p. 912). With the support of Kissinger, Golda Meir fiercely criticized the Rogers Plan during a visit to the United States. Kissinger had said to a close friend of Golda Meir to "tell her wherever she goes, we want her to slam the hell out of Rogers and his plan" (Little, 2008, p. 286). Kissinger was motivated to do this by two factors. On the one hand, he desired a standstill in the conflict to persuade Egypt that their reliance on Soviet assistance was hopeless. On the other hand, he wanted the Middle East policy by William Rogers to fail because of their rivalry (Isaacson, 2015, p. 1187).

Despite Kissinger's disclosure that his understanding of the Middle East was limited, official historical documents from the year 1973 reveal that Kissinger, beyond doubt, did have a preconception of the Middle East. During a conversation with Kissinger about the rising tensions in the Middle East prior to the start of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Nixon says that they "don't want to have a Middle East war on our hands or consciences this summer". Kissinger responds to this that "there is a chance that it can happen simply because of the irrationality of the Arabs" (Office of The Historian, 2011, p. 178).

In May 1973, Kissinger, as the National Security Adviser for the President of the United States, traveled to Moscow for an official meeting with Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. During this meeting, Kissinger made a comment that made his preconception of the Middle East observable:

> *"You know the story of the scorpion who wanted to cross the Suez Canal. He asked a camel if he could ride on his back. The camel said, "If I do and you sting me, I will be dead." The scorpion said, "I will drown also, so you have every guarantee." So, the camel took the scorpion on his back and they started across. In the middle of the Canal the scorpion stung the camel and as they drowned the camel asked, "what did you do this for? The scorpion said, "you forgot this is the Middle East". (Office of The Historian, 2011, p. 156)*

Kissinger's remark during this conversation reveals the possible existence of preconceptions about the Middle East, its people, and their personalities that he has. Kissinger uses metaphoric terms to characterize the Middle East and its people in this conversation. A scorpion asks for help from the camel, but the camel distrusts the scorpion. However, the camel chooses to help as a consequence of the scorpion's rational explanation and assurance that it gives. As they pass the Suez Canal, the scorpion chooses to betray the camel, with the knowledge that it would result in its own death, and mocks the camel for forgetting their geographical location. Even if they realize that being loyal is in their best interests, the people of the Middle East are characterized as treacherous.

A process of "othering" is evident while it is implied that the Middle East is outside of the mainstream. In other words, a distinction between the "civilized" and the "uncivilized" is implied. Such discursive practices, according to Fairclough and Wodak (1997, p. 258), "produce and reproduce unequal power relations" between cultural majorities and minorities. As a result, unequal treatment of minorities may be justified. Furthermore, because they are linked with non-human entities, Middle Easterners are animalistically dehumanized. This type of dehumanization rejects the possession of "traits that are uniquely human" for the out-group such as rationality, reason and emotion (Utych, 2018, p. 440).

During the same meeting, Kissinger told a second story about the inhabitants of the Middle East in which metaphors are used that describe the Middle Eastern as lazy and irrational who starts to believe in his own lies:

> *"There is a story about an Arab lying in his tent trying to take an afternoon sleep. There were a lot of children making a lot of noise. So, he told the children, "In the village they are giving away free grapes and you should go there." So, the children went away to the village. It got very quiet. Just as he was falling asleep he said to himself, "You idiot, what are you doing here if they are giving away free grapes?" So, he went to the village". (Office of The Historian, 2011, p. 156)*

Kissinger's preconception regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict is also seen in the months leading up to and during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. On the first day of the conflict, Kissinger had his first conversation by phone with the Soviet Ambassador to the United States. In this conversation, Kissinger tells the Soviet Ambassador that Israel expects an attack by Syrian and Egyptian forces within 6 hours, and tries to communicate the severity of the situation (Office of The Historian, 2011, p. 289).

Hours before the 1973 Arab-Israeli War started, Kissinger preferred to conduct diplomacy with Egypt through the Soviet Union, but preferred direct communication with Israel. Kissinger considered Egypt as a client state of the Soviet Union, given that the Soviet Union supplied the majority of Egypt's military equipments. It can be argued that this style of diplomatic conduct by Kissinger was motivated by preconceptions. First of all, Egypt is neglected by Kissinger and treated as an unequal entity in global affairs. Secondly, while intelligence reports state that Egypt and Syria will start the offensive, Kissinger decides to contact the Israelis first.

This illustrates Kissinger's higher regard for the State of Israel's ability to control itself and resist aggression. Therefore, a "rational" versus "irrational" distinction is being made by Kissinger. This is in accordance with Edward Said's illustration of the relation between the Orient and the West. According to Said (2003, p. 40), the Western world conducts its relationship with the Orient on the assumption that the

Oriental is "irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, and thus different" while the Western world is "rational, virtuous, mature, and thus normal."

As the 1973 Arab-Israeli War began, U.S. policymakers underestimated the Egyptian-Syrian alliance and disregarded the possibility for them to win the war. According to intelligence reports, the Israeli army would have no trouble defending itself and the territories that it seized in 1967. On the same day as the war erupted, an intelligence estimated that "the Israelis have the strength to blunt the Syrian offensive capability within a few days and, as quickly, to push the Egyptians back across the canal" (Spinder, 2016, p. 48). Likewise, in a meeting with the Chinese Ambassador on the 6th of October, 1973, Kissinger proclaimed his expectations for the conflict and concluded that Israel would win quickly while Egypt and Syria would urge Kissinger to mediate a ceasefire: "The Arabs will be pleading with us to get this for them, since within 72 to 96 hours the Arabs will be completely defeated" (Office of The Historian, 2011, p. 338).

This overall mindset is clearly observable from a meeting that Kissinger had on the first day of the war with participants from the Department of Defence, Joint Chiefs of Staff, CIA and National Security Council. During this meeting, words and phrases that have derogatory and negative connotations towards the Egyptians and Syrians were used by U.S. policymakers several times. To illustrate, phrases such as the "Israelis appear to have contained them [the Syrians]", the Israelis will "severely punish Syria", the "Egyptians have no place to hide", the "Arabs in their demented state" will be "begging us for it [a ceasefire]", the "crazy Arabs", Arabs being "duplicitous", and Arabs that "misbehave" that go on a "rampage" are used in this meeting (Office of the Historian, 2011, p. 324).

The usage of these phrases indicates the existence of an atmosphere of support, or even an aspiration, for Israeli success in the conflict. By saying that the Israelis have "contained" the Syrians, it is implied that something which is harmful has been limited by the beneficial. Furthermore, Israel is expected to "punish" Syria, implying that one side in the war has the responsibility and power to discipline the other. As a result, the participants in this meeting are reinforcing a superior versus inferior relationship. Binary oppositions, as Said (2003) mentions, are being used in this meeting to ascribe inferior qualities to the "other", which in turn define and ascribe superior qualities to the "self".

It's worth noting that the aspiration for Israeli success is most evident among attendees from the Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, CIA, and National Security Council during this meeting. Kissinger, on the other hand, preferred to refer to the "other" through derogatory terms. Egyptians and Syrians, he said, are in a "demented" state and would soon come to him begging for a return to the status quo ante. Kissinger portrays the Egyptians and Syrians as insane and irrational for attempting to reclaim

regions that have been under Israeli occupation since 1967. Similarly, Kissinger criticizes the Arabic people of being "duplicitous", something which he also implied during his meeting with Brezhnev, but makes no similar remarks about the occupation's persistence by Israel, despite the UNSC's condemnation.

Contrary to U.S. intelligence assessments, the reality was much different. Egypt and Syria advanced quickly into the illegally occupied territory, destroying nearly all Israeli military positions. As a result, within days after the conflict began, Prime Minister Golda Meir approached the United States for assistance. In fact, "in an atmosphere of confusion, anxiety, and uncertainty", Israel's sense of fear was so strong that Israeli decision-makers had decided to put nuclear-armed Jericho ballistic missiles on alert (Colby, Cohen, McCants, Morris, and Rosenau, 2013, p. 50).

On October 7 1973, a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting was convened to discuss the recent situation on the battleground in the Middle East. As Kissinger is being briefed on the surprising success of Syrian and Egyptian advancements on the battlefield, Kissinger is clearly surprised by the situation and asks "Then how do you explain the cockiness of the Arabs? Why aren't they calling for a ceasefire?" (Office of The Historian, 2011, p. 355).

As a result of his preconceptions, Kissinger made significant mistakes in his reasoning regarding the possible developments in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In his interpretation of events, elements of Oriental characteristics are evident. In his reasoning, the Egyptians and Syrians acted irrationally, idiotic and dishonest in their attempt to reestablish control over illegally occupied territories. In addition, the defence forces of Egypt and Syria were treated as inferiors to the superior "modern" Israeli forces by Kissinger. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that his preconceptions influenced his foreign policy decisions towards the 1973 Arab-Israeli War to some extent. Another aspect is Kissinger's understanding of history, more specifically, his understanding of how history works. Kissinger assumed that the Egyptians and their allies would not attempt to challenge Israel again since the war in 1967 made "Arab weaknesses abundantly clear" (Suri, 2008, p. 732). His deductive reasoning, however, became invalid as hostilities broke out.

On the second day of the conflict, a conversation between Kissinger and the White House Chief of Staff took place which further reveal preconceptions that Kissinger holds regarding the Egyptians and Syrians. Here, Kissinger admits that the "Arabs are doing better than anyone thought possible" (Office of The Historian, 2011, p. 343). The Israelis were in a panic and were hoping for military assistance from the United States. As a result, the conversation focused on getting military equipment to Israel as quickly as possible in order to avoid an Arab victory in the conflict. This demonstrates that Kissinger shares the Israeli concerns.

More importantly, as his pre-war predictions proved to be incorrect, it is shown that on the second day of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Kissinger considered the possibility of success in the war by the Egyptians and Syrians to be disastrous. This demonstrates that his early ideas were based on wishful thinking rather than rational assessments. Additionally, a military success by the Arabs, according to Kissinger, would make them "impossible" to deal with and to negotiate a ceasefire (Office of The Historian, 2011, p. 343). Even if Kissinger does not further elaborate on this comment, it is implied that, in the case of Arab success, the Arabs will act unfair, inflexible and selfish during a ceasefire negotiation. Since Kissinger wants to prevent a military success by Egypt and Syria, Kissinger has, in his own judgment, assigned fair-unfair, flexible-inflexible and selfish-unselfish traits to the two sides of the conflict.

It is also implied in this conversation that if the Israelis will be defeated, Kissinger argues, the defeat, and the subsequent change in the status quo, "will be ascribed to our own domestic crisis" [the Watergate scandal] (Office of The Historian, 2011, p. 343). Thus, Kissinger reaffirms his desire for Israeli success in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War to the White House Chief of Staff, often referred to as the closest advisor to the President of the United States. However, given the widespread Western support for the State of Israel, the defeat of Israel would also have a negative impact on U.S. influence in international affairs.

Kissinger's concern, shared by the State of Israel, over a scenario in which the Egyptians and Syrians have superiority in the war, undoubtedly influenced his decision to approve weapon deliveries to Israel. It should be added that, Kissinger was also heavily influenced by Israeli diplomats in his decisions regarding the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. More specifically, Kissinger listened attentively to Israeli ideas and typically executed his policies in line with them. According to Tal (2014, p. 36), "Kissinger maintained an almost open line with the Israeli embassy, and acted in accordance with what he heard from its diplomats." As a result, the Israelis were "able to play an active role in the conduct of American policy toward Israel" since they had direct access to Kissinger and President Nixon (Tal, 2014, p. 36).

The war's trajectory began to change in Israel's favor as a result of the U.S. military aid provided to Israel. It is safe to assume that when Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir expressed her gratitude personally to Kissinger during a meeting, military aid from the United States had a significant impact on the war's outcome: "I know what you did. Without you, I don't know where we would have been. I went to the airfield the other day and I watched the planes come in. It was more than I could ever have dreamed" (Office of The Historian, 2011, p. 657).

When it became clear that the State of Israel would not lose the war, Kissinger met with Secretary General Brezhnev on October the 21st. At this meeting, they successfully negotiated a ceasefire agreement.

The next day, Kissinger traveled immediately from Moscow to Tel Aviv to meet with Prime Minister Golda Meir to discuss the agreement in detail. During this meeting, Kissinger encouraged Israel to keep fighting until the UNSC voted on the negotiated ceasefire. Kissinger told Meir that "if something happens during the night", Israel "won't get violent protests from Washington", and recommended that Israel should keep fighting even if Egypt and Syria would stop (Office of The Historian, 2011, p. 658). This would allow Israel to gain the maximum strategic advantage prior to possible peace negotiations.

> *On December 22, 1973, the Geneva Peace Conference was organized in order to maintain this cease-fire and find a settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, the meeting did not produce any tangible results. Nonetheless, it was groundbreaking, according to Isaacson (2015, p. 1266-1267), since it was the first time since 1948 that Arabs and Jews negotiated peace on a political level, with the United States as the ultimate authority and Kissinger as its "personification." However, given that the Palestinian issue was neither addressed or even mentioned, the conference's goal was dubious. In fact, Syria boycotted the meeting because the United States and Israel refused to allow the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate (Isaacson, 2015, p. 1264-1265).*

During a conversation with the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, Kissinger boasts about his efforts for a ceasefire in the Middle East. While doing so, Kissinger again ridicules the Arabs by saying that "In the nutty Arab world I am sort of a mythical figure. The Arabs think I am a magician" (Office of The Historian, 2011, p. 355).

Kissinger believed that the Palestinian issue was too complex for both the Israelis and Arabs to agree on, therefore he dismissed it to the status of a refugee crisis. It is reasonable to deduce from this that Kissinger did not believe that Palestinians had the right to their own state. To illustrate, in order to get meaningful deals in the Middle East, one of the primary components of his diplomacy in the region was to clearly neglect and exclude the Palestinian question, Israel's state borders, and the status of Jerusalem (Isaacson, 2015, p. 1253). However, these were the most pressing issues that needed to be addressed. Similarly, the Palestinian question was barely included in Kissinger's policy calculations, as evidenced by the official historical documents regarding the 1973 Arab-Israeli War that have been analyzed.

Furthermore, even after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War ended, Kissinger's discourses continued to contain a style which may be identified as arrogance and condescending. For example, Kissinger states in a meeting with his staff that "everyone is coming to us [the United States] on their knees begging us for a settlement"

(Office of The Historian, 2011, p. 841). Here he emphasizes the dominant position that the United States has gained as a result of the war and belittles the Arabs.

While some parts of the analyzed official historical documents may make it appear that Kissinger's Middle East policy at the time was based on maintaining the status quo, the reality is that the dynamics in the region had shifted dramatically. As a result of his diplomatic endeavours, Kissinger had changed the focus of the Arab countries. This change emphasized gradualism and bilateralism, which undermined the fragile structures of Arab unity in the regions while emphasizing the maintenance of barriers between these nations, further dividing and isolating them from one another. As Said (1980, p. 170) asserts, Kissinger's foreign policy after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War promoted ideas about the Middle East which "encouraged thought neither about the past nor the future but only the present."

Adherence to such policies decreased unity and cooperation in the region which is still relevant up to this day. The United States encouraged governments throughout the region to view existing situations as a static whole rather than as a dynamic whole. As a result, the continuity and consistency between distinct situations was abruptly broken. The links between governments, between cohabiting societies, and between past and future issues became to be regarded as either minor issues or sometimes even non-existent.

The key motives that furthered this fragmentation within the Middle East region were Kissinger's diplomatic efforts during and after the war of 1973. In addition, the United States assumed the role of mediator between nations, peoples, and institutions, while also substituting regional cooperation among governments and societies for its own interests. By doing so, a principal characteristic of Orientalism becomes obvious. It becomes easy to depict the "other" in a way that furthers one's political goals. More crucially, an inferior status is assigned, allowing the "other" to be controlled, influenced, and restrained.

CONCLUSION

Orientalism in Henry Kissinger's discourse and policies are not limited to Arab-Israeli War of 1973. For instance, according to recently disclosed tapes, the existence of an Orientalist attitude by Kissinger prior to the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 can be observed. The contents of these tapes demonstrate how Henry Kissinger expressed biases towards Pakistanis during the 1971 conflict between West Pakistan (current Pakistant) and East Pakistan (current Bangladesh). Kissinger said to President Nixon, "I tell you, the Pakistanis are fine people, but they are primitive in their mental structure," during a conversation over whether the Pakistani would execute the Bengali nationalist leader who was imprisoned (Bass, 2020).

As has been shown in other analyses, it is also possible to observe multiple examples of Kissinger's preconceptions that can be defined as the product of an Orientalist worldview. For instance, in his thesis, Downwall discusses how Kissinger downsizes the importance of Africa in world politics and uses stereotypes to portray the Africans as an "uncivilized mass that needed the paternal guidance of white rulers" (2009, p. 36). Dowdall describes through multiple examples how Kissinger identified Africans as "pre-historic monsters", "uneducated apes", smelly, tom-tom thumping cannibals, or at best, "nice little guys" that did not have anything of value to offer American foreign policy interests". To illustrate, right before Kissinger would attend a dinner organised for African ambassadors at the White House, Kissinger remarked to a U.S. Senator that he was wondering "what the dining room is going to smell like" (as cited in Dowdall, 2009, p. 39).

In this study, 425 official historical documents from the Foreign Relations of the United States:1969-1976, Volume XXV: Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973 series were examined in relation to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Additional materials, such as biographies and autobiographies, were consulted as well. As evidenced by these documents, Kissinger's opinions and judgements are indeed compatible with Orientalism. Kissinger regularly employed "we" versus "them" dichotomies while also implying that the "other" possessed inferior attributes prior to and during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. As a result, Orientalist components in Kissinger's problem-solving, reasoning, and planning processes in U.S. foreign policy toward the 1973 Arab-Israeli War have been recognized.

For this study, assaults on norms, comparisons, and polarization categories within ideological discourse analysis have been explored. To begin with, it is shown that Kissinger has labeled the culture and morality of the Arabs as duplicitous during his policy considerations. Therefore, the norms and values of an outer group were assaulted and mocked with during this process. Second, Kissinger has several times implied the presence of a superior versus inferior relationship in his discursive practices by using comparisons between the Western world and the Middle East during meetings. These comparisons have been utilized to establish a "we" versus "them" dichotomy on which he justifies policy decisions regarding the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.

Finally, Kissinger employs polarizing discourses to emphasize the disparities between "we" and "them" that are formed through the utilized comparisons. During policy talks, terms like "crazy" and "demented" Arabs are used to attribute inferior qualities to the "other", which in turn attribute superior qualities to the "self". It is apparent from the consulted sources that Kissinger had, to some extent, preconceived ideas that are in accordance with Orientalism during his foreign policy decision-making

processes. As a result, the notion by Edward Said that Orientalism serves as a powerful political tool to dominate the Orient is applicable to the research outcome.

While the anecdotes that Kissinger shared with Brezhnev months before the 1973 Arab-Israeli War occurred may not be considered as policy, they do provide insight into Kissinger's thoughts on the Middle East. Furthermore, as the 1973 Arab-Israeli War unfolded, Kissinger had based his policy judgments on misinterpretations. These misinterpretations are plainly the product of his preconceived ideas regarding the Arabs. Kissinger felt that the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces were no match for the Israeli armed forces, while he also characterized the Arabs as duplicitous, irrational, and demented in their efforts to reclaim regions that State of Israel held illegally under occupation since 1967. However, the rapid success of the surprise attack by Egypt and Syria shocked the State of Israel and resulted in the active involvement of the United States due to Kissinger's fear for a loss by Israel. Similarly, Kissinger's preference to communicate directly with Israeli officials and indirectly with the Egyptians and Syrians during the war is both a result of his misinterpretations and condescending attitude. This preference, along with his preconceived ideas regarding the Arabs, indicate that Kissinger's foreign policy decisions during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War may have been influenced by these preconceived ideas.

Furthermore, a change in Kissinger's thought process are observable as the 1973 Arab-Israeli War occurred. Initially, Kissinger is not really concerned with Middle Eastern politics and policy. However, as the 1973 Arab-Israeli War transpired, Kissinger started to allocate the Middle East as a priority on his foreign policy agenda. During discussions for policy decisions regarding the war, Kissinger allocates on several occasions derogatory personifications towards the Egyptians and Syrians. On the contrary, Kissinger adjusts his mindset regarding Middle Eastern countries as the oil crisis takes place. Contrary to Kissinger's assumptions, the Middle Eastern countries were able to act in harmony and use oil as an instrument to influence the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. As the official historical documentation shows, Kissinger appears to be perplexed, if not impressed, by this display of might and appears to become less condescending towards Middle Eastern governments.

Similarly, Kissinger had a negative image of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat before and during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Despite the fact that Kissinger had never met Sadat, he dismissed him as a "clown" and refused to take him seriously (Isaacson, 2015, p. 1253). However, throughout his diplomatic travels to Egypt, he started to respect Sadat and was able to successfully negotiate with him. While previously he had labeled him as a "bombastic clown", Kissinger now designated Sadat as "the greatest since Bismarck" (Zeidan, 1984, p. 57). Therefore, as the State of Israel had evaded a decisive defeat in the war as a result of

U.S. military support, it appears that Kissinger moves away from a process of "othering" towards a more embracing stance regarding the Middle East.

Through this research, a factor other than mainstream explanations is identified which played a role in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy towards the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. This shows that the Cold War was not the only leading force in Kissinger's policy decisions. The prospect of Soviet expansionism was only one factor at play. Power politics, preconceived ideas and stereotyping also played a role in Kissinger's decision-making processes. Orientalist notions are indeed evident in Henry Kissinger's foreign policy decision-making practices towards the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. To what extent these notions have influenced Kissinger's decisions remains as a topic for future research.

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