

A Relational Conception of Justice: The Theory of Recognition and Moral Injury -Proposals for a Practical Evaluative Framework-^{1 2}

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Abstract

Primarily developed within political philosophy, comprehensive theories of justice are often considered abstract and transcendental for sociological, political, or economic applications and thus, often require further conceptual and analytical clarifications. This need is apparent in recognition theory, a contemporary theory of justice pioneered by Axel Honneth. In it, he underlines the importance of recognition in intersubjective and mutual relations with significant others, legal institutions, and wider society, the denial of which leads to particular forms of injustice, conceptualised as moral injuries. To overcome the functional weakness inherent in recognition theory's relatively abstract nature, this article clarifies the distinction between its "space" and "object" of evaluation to advance its practical usefulness in assessing disadvantage. In doing so, it first examines the theory of recognition as well as the concept of moral injury and addresses issues researchers and practitioners need to be attentive to concerning the categorisation of the good, the promise of recognition, and the pressing problem of unwarranted claims. Having taken these clusters of concerns into account, this article identifies (1) deformative identity formation, (2) invisibilisation, and (3) stigmatization as morally injurious acts and proposes three dimensions of evaluation, namely physical integrity, moral accountability, and personal autonomy, upon which certain forms of injustices that disadvantaged individuals or groups experience can be assessed within the normative framework of the theory of recognition.

Keywords: Political Sociology, Social Justice, Recognition, Moral Injury, Axel Honneth

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İlişkisel Bir Adalet Anlayışı: Tanınma Kuramı ve Etik Zarar -Uygulamaya Dönük Bir Öneri-

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Öz

Esas olarak siyaset felsefesi alanında geliştirilmiş olan adalet kuramları sosyolojik, siyasal ve ekonomik uygulamalar söz konusu olduğunda oldukça soyut ve aşkın bir nitelik göstermekte; bu sebeple ek kavramsal ve analitik açıklamaları gerektirmektedirler. Söz konusu kuramların muhteva ettiği bu ihtiyaç Axel Honneth'in öncülüğünü yaptığı çağdaş bir adalet kuramı olan tanınma teorisinde de açıkça gözlemlenmektedir. Tanınma kuramında, Honneth, bireyin kendisi için öncelikli olan aktörlerle, yasal kurumlarla ve geniş toplumsal yapıyla sürdürdüğü özneler arası ve karşılıklı ilişkilerde tanınırlığın öneminin altını çizmekte ve bu üç alanda tanınırlığın reddinin etik zarar olarak kavramsallaştırdığı özgün bir adaletsizliğe yol açtığını vurgulamaktadır. Bu çalışma, tanınırlık kuramının soyut doğasına içkin olan işlevsel zayıflığın üstesinden gelmek amacıyla, dezavantaja ilişkin olarak söz konusu kuram çerçevesinde gerçekleştirilecek pratik uygulamalarda kullanılmak üzere "değerlendirme alanı" ve "değerlendirme ölçütü" arasındaki ayrımın altını çizmektedir. Bu çerçevede, tanınma kuramı ile etik zarar kavramsallaştırması irdelemekte ve araştırmacılar ile uygulayıcıların dikkat göstermesi gereken üç temel eleştiri olarak iyinin sınıflandırması, tanınırlık vaadi ve nedenselleştirilemez/temelledirilemez taleplere dikkat çekmektedir. Söz konusu bu eleştiriler çerçevesinde, (1) deforme edici kimlik oluşumu, (2) görünmez kılınma ve (3) damgalama etik zarar kavramsallaştırmasını tanımlayan davranışlar/uygulamalar olarak işaret edilmekte; dezavantajlı gruplar veya bireylerin maruz kaldığı kimi adaletsizlik biçimlerinin tanınma kuramının normatif bakış açısı çerçevesinde gerçekleştirilecek analizlerinde kullanılmak üzere fiziksel bütünlük, etik sorumluluk ve kişisel bağımsızlık birer değerlendirme ölçütü olarak önerilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Siyaset Sosyolojisi, Sosyal Adalet, Tanınma, Etik Zarar, Axel Honneth

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Introduction

A core issue in the contemporary literature of (re)distributive justice relates to the selection of an explicit “space of evaluation” to identify how the justness of an action, decision, policy, law, or any form of legal regulation can be assessed in terms of its appropriateness over other normative perspectives. Scholarly discussions on this issue have yielded compelling normative arguments and schools of thought, some of which advocate liberties, entitlements/rights, individual skills and talents, resource ownership, or individual capability as the most pertinent space of evaluation when considering the justness of social and institutional arrangements. A drawback in these deliberations is the iterative confusion between the concept of “space of evaluation” mentioned above and “object of evaluation,” which specifies the individual characteristics or opportunities upon which an individual’s (dis)advantage can be assessed. To illustrate, the liberal school of social justice advocates for individual liberty as the appropriate space of evaluation in determining the extent to which a society can be judged as just. Empirical work that considers this space of evaluation in its analysis of (re)distributive issues in particular settings may opt to examine the protection of individuals’ entitlements in the face of “legal restrictions in the free acquisition of property”, “social constraints in acquiring and holding goods”, or “institutional hindrances in the free transfer of one’s possessions” as its objects of evaluation, in line with principles proposed by Nozick (1974, p. 151), considered a leading figure in contemporary libertarian understandings of justice.

The distinction between the space of evaluation and the object of evaluation is relatively clearer for historically well-developed theories of (re)distributive justice. For example, a utility-based understanding of a just society acknowledges aggregated public utility as the most appropriate space of evaluation in its assessment of the justness of an action and decision, while it specifies varied forms of subjective well-being, such as happiness, desire-fulfilment, or preference satisfaction, as the objects of evaluation. However, contemporary emerging perspectives on just society are largely insufficiently clear with this distinction, primarily due to disagreements concerning the selection of the most appropriate object(s) of evaluation. In evaluating people’s (dis)advantage, capability-based assessments of justice, for example, point to individuals’ capability or freedom to achieve what they (have reason to) value as its space of evaluation (see Sen, 1999, pp. 74-76; 2009, pp. 231-235; Nussbaum, 2000, p. 12; 2011, pp. 17-18). However, what “valuable beings and doings” -in other words, opportunities-individuals should be capable of achieving is still a matter of debate among leading figures of the approach (see Arun, 2022). This apparent lack of clarity in selecting the object of evaluation poses significant difficulties when applying normative transcendental theories of a just society for evaluative practices that assess experiences of injustice and (dis)advantage, placing these frameworks of justice at risk of mainly remaining as philosophical reflections with limited practical value. Due to its abstract nature, this nascent vulnerability is also an issue for a relatively recent theory of a just society—the recognition-based conception of justice pioneered by Axel Honneth (1995), where the distinction between space and object of evaluation needs further clarification for practical application.

The theory of recognition provides an idea of justice that is not anchored on individual qualities and holdings/possessions but rather on the primacy of intersubjective and mutual relations with significant others, legal institutions, and wider society for achieving full self-realisation, which it sees as the precondition to the good life. Its vision of a just society further avoids the pitfall of viewing individuals in a context where they are detached from others. Instead, it argues that individuals need to be recognised by others within various spheres

of social interaction (Honneth, 1995, p. 172). As a relational account of justice, this framework finds the absence or denial of recognition as forms of injustice, categorising these as “moral injuries”. However, similar to the concept of recognition (the space of evaluation), the concept of moral injury (the object of evaluation) is still relatively abstract, particularly for evaluative practices that aim to assess individual (dis)advantage based on Honneth’s view of justice; thus, it needs further specification.

We begin by shedding light on distinctive qualities of the theory of recognition in a way that also connects to its conceptual roots in Hegelian philosophy, explaining its advocacy for mutual recognition as the primary space of evaluation for a just society. Subsequently, we turn our attention to the concept of moral injury as the object of evaluation for recognition-based assessments of (in)justice and (dis)advantage by discussing a cognate concept, its uses in the broader literature, and its shortcomings. Following this, we identify three clusters of concerns about (1) the categorisation of the good, (2) the promise of recognition, and (3) the problem of unwarranted claims to respond to areas of note about what is in certain parts, its abstract and problematic elements. Finally, drawing on both theoretical and empirical works within the existing literature as well as constructs inherent to recognition theory, we offer three domains: (1) moral injury against physical integrity, (2) moral injury against moral accountability, and (3) moral injury to personal autonomy, through which a recognition-based conception of justice can be used for evaluative practices assessing various forms of injustices as well as disadvantage.

A Relational Account of Justice: Honneth’s Hegelian Idea of Recognition

One of the earliest and most important theoretical deployments of the notion of recognition is that of Hegel’s during his early “Jena period”, dated between 1801-1806, which centre on mutual recognition in human relationships as the basis for the emergence of (self)consciousness within human sociality. However, the concept suffered relative neglect until Charles Taylor’s seminal publication entitled *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition* (1992) espousing the idea of recognition within institutional contexts of pluralism amidst existing political debates on group identity, equal respect, and difference. Taylor (1992, p. 26) casts recognition as a “vital human need”, such that its absence, either by the disrespect, denial, or misrecognition of others, can cause individual or collective damage. Some years after this effort, Honneth sidesteps Taylor’s usage with *The Struggle for Recognition* (1995) as he revisits Hegel’s philosophical reflections with a normative theory of recognition.

In conceptualising recognition, Hegel may have drawn from the work of Johann Fichte primarily in *Foundations of Natural Right* (1796 [2000]), where the latter elaborated a transcendental and ahistorical explanation of the importance of recognition in terms of coordinated action between subjects from which a form of shared consciousness emerges (Honneth, 1995, p. 16; see also Clarke, 2009; Pippin, 2011). Hegel’s starting point was similarly grounded in mutual recognition between subjects but situated along multiple social spheres encompassing relationships of loving care within familial settings, contractual relations, and social confirmations by the state (Honneth, 1995, p. 11). Hegel saw individuals engaged in a “struggle for recognition” in their interpersonal encounters within these social contexts as they assert, negate, and re-define themselves in relation to others (Sembou, 2003, p. 262). Following Hegel’s logic, individuals should come to expect and require reciprocal recognition from significant others. When the expected recognition is not forthcoming,

individuals inevitably find themselves engaged in a struggle to achieve their recognitive needs within these relational contexts.

Honneth was keen on tacking the recognition struggles that Hegel identified into corresponding experiences of social disrespect. Ultimately concerned with the motivation for the social confrontations that characterised modern society, Honneth aspired to develop a critical understanding of recognition that would connect these pathologies to a logic of social struggle (1992, p. 144). This project led Honneth to form his theory as a normative perspective based on recognition which, he proposes, can explain the universal and normative presuppositions of social interaction and the moral struggles that ensue in its deformation. Honneth's theory of recognition involves a pluralistic conception of justice that helps analyse the personal and social dimensions of the myriad experiences of injustice by marginalised and disadvantaged groups. Recognition theory aids in this task, however, not through the specification of an idealised state or a particular conception of the "good" within which what falls short is judged unjust. According to Honneth, authentic and "full" self-realisation, which he identifies as what enables individuals to live a good life, emerges from one's capacity to relate with others in various spheres of social interactions within primary relationships (in experiencing "love"), the legal sphere (in the experience of "respect"), and society (through experiencing "esteem") (1995, p. 172). Differentiated, albeit of equal importance, these three types of relationships engender various kinds of "interpersonal entitlements and obligations" (Zurn, 2015, p. 7) and further develop the prospects for attaining "self-confidence", "self-respect", and "self-esteem", respectively. Each is crucial for healthy identity formation, and one can venture that individual identity reflects the patterns of recognition experienced in these various spheres of socialisation. Together, these "modes of practical self-relation" (Honneth, 1995, p. 31) make full self-realisation possible.

Love, in recognitive terms, is primarily experienced in the sphere of relationships with significant others and enables individuals to see their own physical needs and desires as uniquely valuable. When individuals experience love and being loved in return, they learn to understand, and more importantly, trust, their own physical and emotional integrity and the value of their own needs. This embodied knowledge is foundational to building the self-confidence essential in facing the physical and social environment surrounding the agents' lives. The social domain love is experienced initially is in familial settings, within which, borrowing from Donald Winnicott's psychoanalytic work (1965 [1990]) on the socialisation of young children, Honneth (1995, p. 98) traces positive infant experiences of love and trust from maternal figures and are most crucial to individuation and early identity formation (Bainbridge, 2015, p. 10). Subsequent relationships of love and friendship with one's social peers also encompass experiences of mutual affection and care. In these intersubjective engagements with responsive others, self-confidence fully emerges and develops. However, such basic self-confidence is not based on individuals' material possessions or abilities but on the aptitude to express their embodied needs and desires without fear of being rejected. The tragedy of violent injuries against the integrity of the body, such as in the paradigmatic examples of rape and torture, is not just in the realm of physical and psychic pain but in that these attacks present a vicious imposition of one will over another to the denigration of the victim's bodily confidence and autonomy—such acts bear profound implications for how one relates to others, physically or otherwise (Honneth, 1995, p. 132; Zurn, 2015, p. 33).

Once individuals can trust in the value of their own needs, they can then seek respect within the legal sphere by making claims of personal significance as full members of society. For Honneth, recognition of others as legal peers entails acknowledging them as autonomous beings with equal rights, who equally bear their own justice concerns and potentials for self-legislation and contribute to deliberations that are of consequence in their lives (Zurn, 2015, pp. 55ff). Indeed, having healthy self-confidence (or experiencing love) alone is not sufficient to attain social respect from others (Kauppinen, 2011, p. 270) nor achieve the form of respect for self that individuals need. It is only when individuals receive equal treatment and are ascribed moral accountability as legal peers that a sense of certainty and security regarding the value of their own judgments and self-expression are engendered—this is when a measure of self-respect is achieved (Honneth, 1995, p. 132). Self-respect emerges in this regard as a moral prerequisite and motivation for personal assertions in the public sphere and the willingness to regard the other's voice as that of a "legally equal interaction partner" (ibid., p. 134). Consequently, self-respecting individuals must mirror a type of recognition that acknowledges the same status and privilege in others.

Finally, when individuals' abilities, unique traits, and contributions are affirmed as having value to a concrete social community, they experience a feeling of worth and accomplishment that translates into a sense of self-esteem (Zurn, 2015, p.70). Consistent with Honneth's previous points, esteem here is internal and socially attributive. The affective and social ties gained through ties of emotion such as love and subsequently legal recognition allow for self-conceptualisations that incorporate questions of value and what constitutes as worthwhile contributions to society or the common good. In this context, one experiences a sense of what makes one a unique, special, and particular "individual", which is an end in itself. Such attributions are also socially situated, as estimations of value and utility hinge on a range of social and cultural factors. This is where Honneth's idea of recognition gains the characteristic of being a relational account of justice that boldly underlines the justness of action concerning individuals' interaction with others. For Honneth, it is in social "solidarity" that self-esteem is possible, as it represents the human capacity to esteem the abilities of the self and the other within the sphere of a community that acknowledges, encourages, and nurtures these valuations.

Honneth's moral point of view covers the range of three independent modes of recognition (within primary relationships, legal, and societal spheres) primarily around the patterns of attitudes that are socially and inter-subjectively situated and normatively expected. Full self-realisation depends on these specific forms of recognition. Thus, achieving recognition in these various spheres of social life is "a vital part of human well-being, a central component of the good life for humans" (Zurn, 2015, p. 50). Attaining these idealised patterns of social recognition constitute an abstract notion of the human flourishing; while violations of these, in cases for instance, of indifference, abuse, neglect, denial of rights, rejection, discrimination, or exclusion, give rise to concrete experiences of injustice (Petherbridge, 2011, p.13). The experience of not getting what individuals believe is the recognition they are due provokes myriad feelings of shame, outrage, and indignation (Honneth, 1992, p. 197). For Honneth, when these negative emotions and feelings occur, in the context of having claims to recognition disregarded, injustice is revealed. Thus, the experience of "disrespect" or "humiliation" becomes the motivation and justification for social struggle, whether in the domains of the local and interpersonal or society-wide and group-based (Zurn, 2015, p. 7).

Having briefly explained the theory of recognition and its specific dimensions in relation to the idea of justice, a question inevitably arises concerning how this deeply abstract relational account can be applied to social analysis. Responding to this query requires attention to the concept of “moral injury”, which lays bare the absence or denial of one or more of the three spheres of recognitive interaction discussed above.

Moral Injury as an Object of Evaluation for a Recognition-Based Conception of Justice

Within the perspective of recognition theory, various forms of suffering experienced by disadvantaged people, the result of intersubjective relations or institutional structures of society, can be seen as informative sources of moral offence. As scholars attempt to make use of the theory of recognition, the notion of moral injury inevitably becomes salient within the various forms of unjust experiences/practices borne by individual agents. In its simplest form, moral injury can be identified as the violations of individuals’ legitimate and normative expectations in their social relationships and calls attention to the deformative aspects of their lives engendered by morally damaging practices of misrecognition. It brings forth an understanding of injustice and just action, albeit implicitly (see also Bernstein, 2010, p. 45), that goes beyond the material injuries of individual agents resulting from the absence of or constraints in material ownership that can be reasonably construed to lead to standards of the good life, such as socio-economic rights of access to education, healthcare, shelter, and so forth. In other words, the concept of moral injury provides an opportunity for an analytical departure beyond identifying concrete experiences or practices of personal suffering and material constraints in individuals’ pursuit of the good life. Thus, evaluative practices require acknowledgement of the moral charge that infuses the subjective assessments and responses of the individuals who experience distinct immaterial forms of disadvantage, such as experiences of misrecognition. Put differently, moral injury can be characterised as the damage to the different spheres of recognition that the affected subjects experience; thus, it results from a denial of recognition within the three Honnetian spheres of primary relationships, legal sphere, and society.

In considering the evaluative use of concepts of “moral injury” in the broader literature, the emerging empirical and ethnographic studies on the effects and consequences of moral injury on people’s well-being have primarily and mostly come from the field of mental health (see Shay, 2014; Litz et al., 2009; Koenig, 2018; Drescher et al., 2011). Construed more narrowly in military healthcare settings, moral injury in this non-recognitive usage often refers to the struggles and associated sufferings experienced by individual agents resulting from violations of their deeply held moral beliefs. The concept has had broad applications: from those experienced by educators (Sugrue, 2020) to front-line healthcare workers (Hines et al., 2021), even chaplains (Hodgson and Carey, 2017) and border guards (Kalkman and Molendijk, 2021). Indeed, as hardships and affliction occur within the moral landscape people inhabit, suffering carries a moral charge. Thus, the subsequent psycho-social damage it leaves in its wake has a moral dimension. In these instances, moral injury becomes a useful analytical instrument in empirically establishing the concreteness of personal suffering that results from violations of personally held standards of morality and its pathological consequences on the overall well-being of the victims. However, both broad and clinical uses shown above do not consider the legitimacy of the actual claims, particularly, for instance, concerning normative standards of justice. As may be expected, while the subject’s psychological state of mind can be correctly identified in the clinical setting, a moral injury “diagnosis” by and of itself does not take these normative notions into account. To use an extreme example, there are qualitative and normative differences between the misery experienced by religious

dogmatists in religiously tolerant societies, the suffering of religious minorities who are institutionally persecuted, and the moral trauma suffered by soldiers in the aftermath of war.

As the concept of moral injury is operationalised to move beyond these non-recognitive and clinical uses and into the evaluation of the justness of actions in society (whether by policy, legal decision, or even acts by significant others), one should keep in mind that there are varieties of practices that can result in moral injury inasmuch as there are varied experiences of recognition. For example, acts of social disrespect in the form of physical abuse, insult, prejudice, or social discrimination directed toward unauthorised migrants. These are problematic to both the individual migrant and the host community since it robs the migrants of the faculty to regard themselves as morally autonomous agents (within their primary relationships), attribute social and legal value to their abilities (within the legal sphere) or relate their mode of life as something of positive significance within their host community (society) (Honneth, 1995, p. 134; Zurn, 2015). The underlying idea here is that the experience of social disrespect is based on “the normative expectations of individuals, which must be construed as moral claims” and not simply setbacks to expectations stemming from narrow socio-economic interests (Deranty and Renault, 2007, p. 92). An important aspect of consideration for evaluative practices in researching individuals’ identity, autonomy, and dignity, which are inextricable components of a morally affluent way of life, is the fact that exclusionary practices and conducts of marginalisation towards disadvantaged individuals are not always ecumenically objective but are given meanings and responded to by the individuals who experience them. Thus, scholars are legitimately expected to consider the subjective perceptions, understandings, and judgments of those at risk or impacted by it.

To this end, within the broader literature, significant attention is being given to the frame of reference of affected individuals in various social settings, for example, those of unauthorised migrants regarding their lack of legal status (Abrego, 2011; Caminero-Santangelo, 2016; Chauvin and Garcés-Mascreñas, 2014; Ehrkamp and Nagel, 2014; Chimienti and Achermann, 2007). Indeed, individual beliefs and judgments about one’s experiences and courses of action include a normative and subjective conception of the good that may not always be collectively shared by others. However, these accounts that give attention to peoples’ subjective perceptions often omit how exclusionary and disadvantageous practices and conducts of marginalisation include a moral component. Furthermore, these studies seldom note how the normatively and subjectively constituted good is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve in these putative settings without healthy social interaction and mutual recognition. To illustrate, a migrant’s ability to speak her language in the host country facilitates her autonomous self-expression and, thus, is necessary in achieving a sense of relational security and self-respect. While this is part of a normatively and subjectively formed conception of the good life that is not explicitly shared by others, achieving this good for the individual who has reason to value it requires her significant others to likewise recognise this reasoned valuation as a good, even those who do not see the freedom to speak her language as a form of the good. This means that recognitive interaction is an inevitable aspect of achieving one’s own or subjective conception of the good. Without this recognition, social suffering, and hence, moral injury, will occur. However, this perspective is absent in the existing relevant literature and, thus, deserves further elaborative attention, as we suggest in this paper. Ultimately, within the perspective of recognition, these forms of social suffering can be understood to constitute a moral offence when it is identified how these negative experiences violate the normative recognitive expectations embedded in specific social

practices, meanings, and institutions (Zurn, 2015, pp. 23-27), and implicitly in all human interaction and practices (Kauppinen, 2002, p. 484).

Below, we provide broader attention to how this perspective can be operationalised in analytical form by identifying and proposing a framework involving three dimensions of moral injury that are engendered by the absence of recognition in human interaction. Before discussing this, we first identify three clusters of concerns that researchers should consider before operationalising this perspective as an analytical and evaluative framework.

Clusters of Concerns Prior to Evaluation

Considering the substantially abstract nature of Honneth's theory of recognition and the comprehensive nature of the concept of moral injury, its operationalisation for evaluating actual cases of injustices suffered by individuals or groups presents unavoidable difficulties. One can ask, for example, how a relational account of justice that is based on the theory of recognition and its object of evaluation being moral injury can be applied to assess peoples' exclusionary and marginalising experiences. Moving from a decidedly abstract theory to practical application would require simplifying and acknowledging particular note-worthy considerations. Given this, we address three clusters of concerns that need to be highlighted when considering how this relational account can be applied to evaluations of the experiences of disadvantaged individuals or groups. These clusters of concerns involve (1) the categorisation of the good, (2) the promise of recognition, and (3) the problem of unwarranted claims, which we examine below.

Honneth's notion of the "good" and how it is established within the framework of intersubjective relationships is the first cluster of concern that needs to be considered before drawing upon a recognition-based relational account of justice for evaluative purposes. Without going into the range of universal-teleological framings of justice (for example, as exemplified by Kantian and Hegelian approaches), we note that objections have been raised about what is often perceived as the substantive content of Honneth's theory of justice and his comprehensive formulation of the good. For instance, Nikolas Kompridis (2004, p. 334) takes issue with Honneth's specification of "self-realisation" as the "good", which centres on what he believes is Honneth's premature assumption of "a very particular conception of the good, and, indeed, of 'well-being' and psychological 'health'". Kompridis argues that ideas of the good carry an unlimited normative surplus of meaning, whether in terms of a single interpretation of the good or in attempts to state the necessary conditions to achieve it. Similarly, Nancy Fraser (2004) and Andrew Sayer (2005), in their critiques of Honneth, underline the multiple ways in which the "good" and what constitutes "the good life" may be defined along different "social fields" (Lovell, 2007). In her debate with Honneth framed "over how best to understand the relation of redistribution to recognition" (Fraser and Honneth, 2004, p. 2), Fraser attempts to distance her brand of recognition from what she claims to be Honneth's ethical and psychological dependence. She tries to strengthen her own theory's normative force as she grounds it in deontological and universally applicable notions of the "right" against Honneth's so-called teleological, sectarian, and particularistic conceptions of the good. Sayer (2005), in his account, notes varying moral beliefs and standards that people hold and assume to hold as universally binding. Sayer refers to his notion of "lay normativity", which encompasses the normative orientations of individuals attuned to and influenced by their social positions and interactions. Ironically, Honneth's hesitation in providing substantive specifications of the "good" may be an appropriate starting point

to address the issues briefly noted above. Honneth presents self-realisation as a precondition for attaining personal well-being however individuals may define or pursue it. Therefore, it is not a particular definition of the “good” but rather a formal idealisation of the moral infrastructure of societies and the patterns of intersubjective attitudes that need to be in place for individuals to achieve self-realisation. What is at stake in these situations is the condition of subjectivity itself (Deranty, 2009)—which means that for Honneth, recognition is the condition of normative life itself, the state in which the subject can socially exist at all, and thus, it is from the standpoint of being recognised that one can begin to address issues of justice. Stated differently, recognition is not simply on the same level as a “primary good”—instead, it identifies the conditions of life in which attaining primary goods might be possible (Deranty, 2009, p. 434). In this sense, any sufficient vision of human flourishing (e.g., self-fulfilment, good life, participatory parity, happiness, subjective well-being), even, for instance, those often articulated by unauthorised migrants themselves (e.g., “wanting legal papers”, “being respected in the workplace”, “becoming a legal migrant”, “earning enough to provide a decent living for the family”, and so forth), will already be involved aspects of Honneth’s notion of mutual recognition.

Another concern points to the underlying difficulties within the idea and possibility of the act of recognition itself, or in other words, the promise of recognition. Arguing from the inherent limitations of subjective agency, Patchen Markell (2003) believes the task of mutual recognition to be impossible or even incoherent. Markell contends that this vulnerability constrains individuals from fulfilling the requirements of mutual recognition as Honneth envisions them. Furthermore, following an Arendtian position, he notes that the practical limits imposed by the “openness and unpredictability of the future” may prevail in the misrecognition of one’s own or another’s identity and, more fundamentally, in the misrecognition of one’s actual situation or circumstance (Markell, 2003, p. 5). As an alternative, Markell suggests that we offer “acknowledgement” instead of recognition, which is a gesture that is grounded in what he deems as a humble acceptance of people’s finitude. For Markell, although and because one cannot always be sure about the normative claims of others, an attitude of openness to possibilities of action and interaction should remain and be maintained (cf. Lemons, 2008).

The final concern that deserves attention is related to this point in conjunction with the misgivings that have been offered regarding the actual possibility of achieving the claims of recognition. Marco Ohlström’s (2011) main critique is that as Honneth starts from the experience of disrespect, he accepts the subjects’ experiences at face value without differentiating warranted from unwarranted claims. In response to this, in contrast to other forms of personal harm, moral injury is primarily experienced within the context of the denials of the normative expectations and intersubjective claims of recognition. Thus, Honneth identifies the claims that can be “warranted”—those that emerge from social interactions of mutual recognition. Markell’s stance on the human condition has some merit, considering our own experiences and misrecognition struggles despite the best intentions. However, people also encounter, in whole or in part, the range “of particular forms of self-realization” (Honneth, 1995) that are fundamentally attainable in our social interactions or in the social life that we may already inhabit. Furthermore, misrecognition does not simply entail the absence of personal acknowledgement in the traditional ways individuals understand their socialisations and civic participation. It is a strong sense of moral indignation “that one has been denied what is one’s due, whether that is respect, honour, dignity, or justice”, out of which one can ascertain the primary motivations of “subjects who are socially excluded, subordinated, marginalized, or stigmatized” (Sinnerbrink, 2007, p. 287).

Three Types of Moral Injury for Evaluative Practices

Having discussed the recognition-based relational account of justice above and keeping the clusters of concerns in mind, we can then enquire about what evaluative practices (e.g., the ones aiming to assess exclusionary experiences and marginalisation of disadvantaged groups) within the theoretical framework (i.e., recognition) and its object of evaluation (i.e., moral injury) potentially and practically focus on. In answering this question and drawing from scholarly discussions in the relevant fields as well as Honneth's early works, we offer three domains: namely (1) moral injury against physical integrity, (2) moral injury against moral accountability, and (3) moral injury to personal autonomy.

Before moving on to explaining these, it is crucial to keep in mind that according to Honneth (1992), the perspective of the affected subject is where categorical acknowledgements of the moral sphere can be explored, as the seriousness of the moral injury directly relates to the type of self-relation it encroaches upon, constrains, or destroys. Given this point, we advocate for these domains in relation to the spectrum of moral injuries affecting the various self-relations (e.g., self-confidence, self-respect, self-esteem) he identified. Each corresponds to a distinct type of injustice and characterises how the subject is disregarded or not recognised; thus, they refer to particular domains within which evaluations of the justness of actions can proceed.

(1) Moral injury against physical integrity: A problem for identity formation

Bodily integrity is a primary component for developing the first expression of self-relation. Self-confidence is acquired, albeit in degrees when individuals' concrete physical existence and unique needs are acknowledged. For Honneth (1992), violent injuries against the integrity of the body, irrespective of the intention, such as abuse, rape, or torture (which Honneth identify as primary examples), are not just tragic because of the physical pain they cause but how it leads to the loss of autonomous control over one's own body. These are considered by Honneth (1992, p. 190) to be brutal forms of disrespect as it involves coercive power or merciless imposition of selfish needs over the other "to the point of being deprived of all sense of reality".

Understandably, the process of identity formation is complex and multi-dimensional, as extensively discussed by various scholars (see Cote and Levine, 2002), and emerges from an ongoing "negotiation of personal given conditions, social context, and relationships, and institutional frameworks" (La Barbera, 2015, p. 1) wherein the body plays a central role as simultaneously object and agent (see Featherstone, Hepworth and Turner, 1991). Studies note how identity formation is also negotiated along self-perceived and externally attributed meanings concerning the body. Examples include body appearance and image, internalisation of body ideals, embodied non-linguistic practices such as movements and gestures, and contested notions of gender, ethnic and racial identities (Wangqvist and Frisen, 2013; McClintock, 2011; Kasperová, 2014; Inda, 2006). Within recognition theory, identity formation occurs in social interaction processes between individuals that are regulated by moral norms "in a manner that secures the minimum necessary conditions for physical integrity and individual autonomy" (Bernstein, 2010, p. 44). In this understanding, bodily integrity and vulnerability are tied to the body's susceptibility to the preventable injuries it may incur in social interaction.

But in the same way that victims of pathology or abuse experience psychic injuries in the body, alternatively, preventable injuries to the body incurred in social interaction may be experienced as injuries to the self. According to J. M. Bernstein (2010, p. 43), the notion of "personal identity" is tied up with the "network of

legitimately regulated relations of mutual recognition” that “allows for the maintaining of physical integrity” and hence, “the presumption about one who is [...] directly parallel with that same being’s bodily integrity”. It is in this sense that moral injuries lead the person to a state of what Bernstein (2010, p. 44) refers to as “organic incompleteness.” This is primarily because, for Bernstein (ibid.), “failures of recognition not only bring about a state of affairs that is like the deterioration of the body, since the body is only itself ‘complete’ through recognition, misrecognition ‘dis-incorporates’ the self, ruining physical and moral integrity at once”.

Although the body and the self may be conceptually differentiated, the distinction is not as clear-cut for identity formation. Dennis Waskul and Pamela van der Riet (2002, p. 488) explain that “a person does not ‘inhabit’ a static object body but is subjectively embodied in a fluid emergent, and negotiated process of being”. Put more succinctly, “we are our bodies and that everything we are and do assumes an embodied form” (Crossley, 2001, p. 140). Viewed in this light, embodiment is the experience and expression of the body in sociality and is central to ongoing identity formation processes. Highlighting this understanding presents an essential insight into how a Cartesian mind and body dichotomy, which, unfortunately, still inhabits certain social, political, and economic thought and practices, as noted by various scholars (see Turner, 2013; Crossley, 2001), can lead to moral injury to physical integrity. For instance, within a rigid duality perspective, a migrant worker can easily be reduced to corporeality, a simple material body from which political and economic goods and cheap labour can be instrumentally extracted to suit the capital. As migrant bodies are de-personalised and commodified, they can then easily be managed, controlled, and made expendable and portable, “in the same way as raw materials –governed by specific rules of trade, unfettered by human right standards” (Boucher and Gest, 2015, p. 9). This is an example of a social pathology that Honneth (2005, pp. 94-95) identifies in terms of reification, where an individual is treated not by their characteristics as a human being but as a life-less “thing” or “commodity”. Thus, moral injury against the physical well-being of individuals is considered a fundamental injury (such as personal degradation) as it destroys the victim’s confidence in the value of their own needs in the perspective of others. This further results in a sense of social shame in terms of “loss of self-confidence and trust in the world”, affecting all practical interaction with others “even at a physical level” (Honneth, 1992, p. 190). Compared to other forms of disrespect, this type of injury has a more profoundly destructive impact on the individual’s practical relation to self (Honneth, 1992, p. 190). It also undermines the healthy development of the other self-relations, namely self-respect and self-esteem.

(2) Moral injury against moral accountability: The problem of invisibilisation

Whereas self-confidence allows individuals to trust in the value of their own needs, self-respect enables them to make claims of personal significance as full members of society who have “a status under a given legal system” (Zurn, 2015, p. 34). Modern societies, according to Honneth (2007, p. 139), are founded on the assumption of the moral accountability of its members that necessarily entails a vision of recognition that first affords universal, equal treatment for all and, second, follows a (Kantian) categorical obligation of “moral respect” towards the accountability of all persons. In these settings, “morally responsible” agents are recognised as “legal persons”— autonomous beings with equal rights who equally bear justice concerns and potentials for self-legislation and contribute to deliberations that are of consequence to their lives. As Sayer (2005) notes, although self-respect can be a profoundly private conviction regarding the value of one’s way of life and activities, it is impossible to maintain without acknowledgement from others. Self-respect emerges, then, as a moral prerequisite and motivation for personal assertions in the public sphere. Hence, situations of social or

structural exclusion, where individuals are socially discriminated against or deprived of certain rights to full participation in society, are considered a moral denigration of their social status and integrity as persons. According to Honneth (1995, p. 134), this exclusion is a form of moral injury, as it deprives one “of the cognitive regard for the status of moral responsibility that had to be so painstakingly acquired in the interactive process of socialization”. The moral harm is of being denied the cognitive respect as a subject whose judgement is valued by others, which individuals can legitimately expect society, as constitutive members, to fulfil.

Honneth also speaks of a social pathology of “invisibilisation”, which involves a double step of cognitive acknowledgement on an elementary level followed by an active disregard or “look[ing] through... as if [the other is] not in the room” (Honneth and Margalit, 2001, p. 115). This form of moral injury can be identified in those situations where a subject takes cognisance of another’s presence and then turns to refuse or deny them the respect they deserve as morally accountable peers (Zurn, 2015). For Honneth, this can be observed in group-specific discrimination or social ostracism, where an acknowledgement of a group falls short of advancing to a respectful appraisal of their other characteristics or even a recognition of their equal status. Building on Honneth’s metaphor of being in a room with another person, being ignored after eye contact has been made is more disrespectful than not being noticed at all, as the former involves a background assumption and conscious devaluation of the person as an equal interaction partner. As a perennial example, in the case of migrants, refugees, and other marginalised peoples, invisibilisation takes place when they are acknowledged, but only as a problem that exists and are thus fitted to be relocated, resettled, segregated, displaced, or removed to render them invisible from others (Sigona, 2005). Most recently, we have seen how the COVID-19 pandemic further exacerbated global healthcare inequities, not just particularly in terms of access provision within each country’s national borders, but also in the displacement of refugees and other marginalised immigrants outside of national or local borders for the sake of the “common good”. Within the context of institutional settings, policies, laws, and logics of enforcement that are grounded on pre-existing assumptions about particular groups, especially in the case of unauthorised migrants who are deemed “illegal”, “bad”, or “undeserving” that do not progress to recognition of their equal moral accountability, is a self-perpetuating action of an inequitable social structure leading to the problem of invisibilisation of the marginalised group.

(3) Moral injury to personal autonomy: The problem of stigma

As individuals earn basic confidence and self-respect through these intersubjective processes of mutual recognition, they achieve a sense of “self-esteem” that views personal attributes as beneficial to themselves and the common good. To be in solidarity with someone in this regard is not limited to feelings of sympathy or passive tolerance but felt concern for what is unique about a person. Only when such care is extended for the other can shared goals be realised. A crucial point here is that solidarity between members of society can be qualified in terms of symmetry and equality. Relations of symmetrical solidarity do not imply equal solidarity in the legal respect, and symmetrical solidarity does not mean that esteem is applied to all to the same degree, as opposed to the respect that must be equally applied to all (Pensky 2011, p. 145). As Honneth (1995, p. 129) explains, “to esteem one another symmetrically means to view one another in light of values that allow the abilities and traits of the other to appear significant for shared praxis.” It also safeguards that “every subject is free from being collectively denigrated, so that one is given the chance to experience oneself to be recognized, in light of one’s own accomplishments and abilities, as valuable for society” (Honneth 1995, p. 130). So, in a modern society where an individual’s unique traits, attributes, and abilities are ideally allowed to flourish, social

disrespect, in the form of insult, prejudice, or social discrimination, becomes problematic to both individual and the larger community, as it robs individuals' opportunity to attribute social value to their ability or relate their "mode of life as something of positive significance within their community" (Honneth 1992, p. 134). Hence, stigmatisation, for instance, can lead to experiences of alienation in that it hinders self-realisation and the identity that individuals derive inter-subjectively in experiences of solidarity (Deranty and Renault, 2007, p. 108). Suppose certain practices or hierarchies of societal values downgrade "individual forms of living and convictions" as inferior and deficient; in that case, it "robs the subjects in question of every opportunity to accord their abilities social value" (Honneth, 1992, p. 191). Furthermore, victims of stigma can internalise the discriminating assumptions of others and may either believe or apply these to themselves, leading to lower levels of self-esteem and other negative symptoms (Drapalski et al., 2013; Corrigan, Watson and Barr, 2006).

Conclusion

In this paper, we identified and clarified the distinction between recognition theory's space and object of evaluation for its practical applications anchored in the normative dimension of individual or group (dis)advantage and experiences of suffering. We argued that distinguishing the concept of recognition as the primary space of evaluation of a just society from the concept of moral injury as the object of evaluation for recognition-based assessments of injustices avoids the functional weaknesses inherent in abstract normative theories of justice in aiding concrete and empirical social analysis. Tracing its origins in the Hegelian tradition within political philosophy, we explained how Honneth's theory of justice normatively advocates for social recognition as the primary space of evaluation for a just society. In turning our attention to the concept of moral injury as the object of evaluation for recognition-based assessments, we also gave particular attention to an important deficiency with non-recognitive uses of the concept of moral injury in the broader literature, particularly in its indifference to stable moral frames of reference and questions of normative legitimacy in relation to the subjects' actual claims.

We then laid out three clusters of concerns that expound on recognition theory's supposed deficiencies—specifically oriented on the categorisation of the good, the promise of recognition, and the problem of unwarranted claims—which we address as areas of legitimate concern given its level of abstraction as a relational account of justice. First, rather than consider it a weakness, we examined Honneth's identification of self-realisation as an essential pre-condition to achieving whatever form of "good" is aspired for within recognitive relationships. As we argued in this paper, this translates to a conceptual openness that allows for the normative legitimacy of other notions of human flourishing, in contrast to other theories of justice that identify specific forms of primary goods. Second, we highlighted a concern regarding the fulfilment of Honneth's requirements for mutual recognition given the limitations of human subjectivity. Indeed, we are familiar with the struggle to recognise others and be recognised by them properly. Despite these difficulties, through practical and validated experience, we maintain that aspects of self-realisation are attainable in social interactions and social life. Thirdly, we find the question relating to the normative justification of claims necessary. We reiterate, along with Honneth, that if experiences of (dis)advantage can be said to occur within contexts of recognitive interaction, then claims of moral injury are justified since these potentially violate the normative expectations springing from human subjectivity itself and which are, thus, embedded in all human interaction.

To specify recognition's object of evaluation, we highlighted three types of moral injuries that consider the affected subjects' moral points of view within exclusionary experiences and disadvantages. We proceeded to suggest concrete domains in relation to the spectrum of moral injuries that potentially damage their various modes of self-relations (e.g., self-confidence, self-respect, self-esteem). As Honneth maintains, because human relationships expect recognition, the denial of recognition demands poses a challenge to individuals' subjective expectations for forming a healthy identity, attaining moral accountability, and maintaining personal autonomy. Thus, as we drew from both theoretical and empirical efforts within the existing literature and what is already inherent within recognition theory, we suggested three analytical domains, namely (1) moral injury against physical integrity, (2) moral injury against moral accountability, and (3) moral injury to personal autonomy, and specify the problems of deformative identity formation, acts of invisibilisation, and direct or indirect acts of stigma against the vulnerable respectively, as primary examples in aid of objective analysis of suffering and disadvantage. First, moral injuries against physical integrity address the damage and deformation individuals or groups can experience in relation to their embodied social presence. When individuals are disrespected in this area, they can lose bodily autonomy and self-confidence, which have important implications for ongoing identity formation. Second, situations of social or structural exclusion can involve acts of invisibilisation that hinder societal obligations of "moral respect" towards the accountability of all persons. Thus, being denied respect through social isolation or wilful disregard of the subject whose judgement is of value to others is morally injurious. Third, as personal autonomy in the social sphere is conditioned by the societal recognition of one's characteristics and potential for contributing to the common good, social disrespect, in the form of insult, prejudice, or social discrimination, deprives both the individual and the community of both the subjective and social value of these aptitudes and abilities. It is in this sense that individual (or collective) denigration in the form of stigma can be considered alienating to the subject's self (hindering positive self-realisation) and sociality (hindering experiences of solidarity).

We argued in this paper that recognitive moral injury needs to be seriously considered to explain how experiences of social exclusion, stigma, discrimination, and so on are violations of the normative expectations of individuals and are, thus, not simple, deserved, or even lawful impediments to attaining certain forms of socio-economic or legal benefit. By considering exclusionary practices and conducts, and the meanings as well as responses of the individuals who experience them, scholars can provide a normative reading of the subjective perceptions, understandings, and judgments of those at risk or impacted by these. In doing so, we argue that the critical task of reconciling the forces of material injury and intersubjective injury, according to a normative standard of justice with critical and practical evaluative usefulness, is made more empirically fruitful.

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Genişletilmiş Özet

Amaç

Dağıtıcı adalet kuramlarının normatif değerlendirme çerçevelerine ilişkin literatüre bakıldığında, bu alandaki normatif kuram ve tadil edici perspektiflerin iki temel soruya cevap vererek kendi özgün iddialarını inşa ettikleri gözlemlenebilir. Bunlardan birincisi sosyal adaletin değerlendirme alanının ne olması gerektiğine ilişkin olarak ileri sürdükleri normatif iddia, ikincisi ise işaret edilen değerlendirme alanının diğer kuramların önerdiği alanlar karşısındaki etik üstünlüğünün nasıl ve/ya neye göre temellendirildiğidir. Kimi normatif çerçeveler bireylerin hak sahipliğinde eşitliğini ya da bazı maddi ve sosyal metalara dönük sahipliği değer dağıtımını düzenleyen yasaların ve sosyal politikaların esasını oluşturması gereken değerlendirme alanları olarak öne sürerken, kimi diğer perspektifler ise kamusal faydayı arttırıcı ya da birey özgürlüklerinin ve yapabilirliklerinin temel değerlendirme çerçevesi olarak esas alınması gerektiğini iddia etmektedir. Öte yandan, söz konusu bu çerçevelerin önerdiği değerlendirme alanları tek başlarına oldukça muğlak, temellendirilmeleri ise oldukça soyut ve çoğu zamanda aşkın epistemolojik tartışmaları beraberinde getirmektedir. Bu sebeple, her ne kadar ilgili kuramlar normatif iddialarını özgün bir sosyal gerçeklik yorumu ile sunsalar da, bu kuramları esas alan ve uygulamaya dönük sosyolojik, siyasal ve ekonomik görgül analizler esas aldıkları kuramların ileri sürdükleri değerlendirme alanlarını temsil eden/oluşturan ölçütleri netleştiren ve temellendiren tamamlayıcı açıklama ve yorumlara ihtiyaç duymaktadırlar. Örneğin, birey yapabilirliklerinin sosyal adalete ilişkin değerlendirmelerde esas alınması gerektiğini iddia eden normatif bakış açısı, kamu otoritesinin ve sosyal yapının bireyin hangi yapabilirliklerinin (dez)avantaj analizlerinde esas alınması gerektiği konusunda üzerinde uzlaşmış bir öneride bulunmamaktadır. Dolayısıyla, özellikle (yeniden) dağıtıcı sosyal adalet literatürü değer dağılımının hangi değerlendirme alanında olması gerektiği konusunda oldukça net iddialar ortaya koysa da, öne sürülen değerlendirme alanlarının hangi değerlendirme ölçütlerince temsil

edilmesi gerektiği konusunda aynı derecede net değildir. Söz konusu, bu muğlaklık Axel Honneth tarafından geliştirilen ve tanınma kuramı olarak bilinen adalet anlayışı için de geçerlidir. Özellikle kuramın normatif değerlendirme alanı ve kavramsal çerçevesi oldukça soyut ve aşkın bir nedensellik üzerine kuruludur. Bu sebeple, sosyal adalet alanında tanınma kuramı çerçevesinde geliştirilecek görgül bir (dez)avantaj analizinin değerlendirme ölçütlerinin ve boyutlarının neler olması gerektiği netlik kazandırılması gereken bir konu olarak karşımızda durmaktadır. Bu noktadan hareketle, tanınma kuramı çerçevesinde gerçekleştirilecek bir dezavantaj analizinde, kuramın özgün kavramsal çerçevesi ile ilişkili olarak, esas alınması gereken temel değişkenlerin tanımlanması ve temellendirilmesi bu çalışmanın başlıca amacını oluşturmaktadır.

Tasarım ve Yöntem

Yukarıda bahsedilen temel amaç çerçevesinde, bu çalışma eleştirel bir literatür okuması ve sorgulama ile hali hazırdaki tanınma kuramının soyut ve aşkın yapısının sosyolojik, siyasal ve ekonomik değerlendirmelere kaynaklık edecek uygulama sınırlılıklarından hareket etmekte ve dolayısıyla da ilgili sınırlılıkları aşmaya dönük bir uygulama önerisinde bulunmaktadır. Bu öneri ele alınan tanınma kuramının kuramsal ve kavramsal çerçevesinin ihtiyaç duyduğu ek tanımlamaları ve açıklamaları gerektirmektedir. Söz konusu bu ihtiyaç çerçevesinde, uygulamaya dönük kuramsal ve kavramsal bir öneri olması sebebiyle, çalışmada eleştirel literatür incelemesi kullanılarak ilgili literatürün bahsedilen amaç çerçevesinde henüz netleştirilmemiş olan yanlarına odaklanılmıştır. Bu çerçevede tanınma kuramının içeriğini oluşturan tanınma olgusunun boyutları tanımlanmış, bu boyutların eksikliğinin ortaya çıkaracağı sorunlara işaret edilmiş ve sorunların ortadan kaldırılması için kuramın uygulanması aşamasında araştırmacıların ve uygulayıcıların odaklanması gereken değişkenler tanımlanmış ve açıklanmıştır. Çalışma ilgili alanda yer alan bir eksik ve/ya muğlaklığın işaret edilmesi ve bu eksiklik ve/ya muğlaklığın nasıl giderileceğine dönük bir öneri olma özelliği gösterdiği için konvansiyonel literatür taramasının ötesinde eleştirel ve analitik bir tartışma yönteminin kullanılmasını gerektirmiştir. Zira, konvansiyonel literatür taraması ilgili literatürü oluşturan hali hazırdaki çalışmalar ve bu çalışmaların yöntem ve bulgularını ilişkisel bir çerçevede aktaran özellik gösterirken, eleştirel literatür incelemesi sadece ilgili literatürü oluşturan çalışmaların yöntem ve bulgularını aktarmaya ve tasnif etmeye odaklanmamakta, fakat aynı zamanda ilgili literatürü oluşturan çalışmaların arka planını oluşturan kuramsal varsayımlara/açıklamalara (Gheondea-Eladi, 2015, p. 172) ve eksiklere (Jesson and Lacey, 2006, pp. 140-145) ilişkin eleştirel bir düşünümsellik sürecini de gerektirmektedir. Bir diğer deyişle, eleştirel literatür taraması ilgili literatürü oluşturan çalışma ve tartışmaların yöntem ve bulgularını belirli bir amaca dönük olarak (metodolojik sınırlılık, geçerlilik, etkinlik, uygulanabilirlik gibi) değerlendirmeyi de gerekli kılmaktadır. Bu çalışma bu çerçevede özellikle ilgili literatürü oluşturan kuramsal ve kavramsal açıklamaları uygulanabilirlikleri üzerinden okumakta ve değerlendirmektedir.

Bulgular

Bu çalışmanın ilgili literatüre dönük eleştirel bir bakış açısıyla gerçekleştirdiği tartışma ve sonrasında ortaya attığı öneri dört ana argüman çerçevesinde şekillenmektedir. Bunlardan birincisi tanınma kuramına dayalı olarak sosyolojik, siyasal ve ekonomik (özel olarak refah ekonomisi) alanlarda gerçekleştirilecek bir dezavantaj analizi öncelikle kuramın sunduğu normatif öneriyle ilgili olarak değerlendirme alanı ve değerlendirme ölçütü arasında analitik bir ayırım yapmalıdır. Bu çerçevede, değerlendirme alanı olarak bireylerin kendileri için öncelikli olan aktörlerle, yasal kurumlarla ve geniş toplumsal yapıyla sürdürdüğü karşılıklı ilişkilerde tanınırlığın altı çizilmektedir. İkinci olarak bu çalışma, ilgili literatüre dayanarak, bu tanınırlığın söz konusu

alanlarda eksikliğinin etik zarar olarak kavramsallaştırılan dezavantaj durumuna yol açtığını belirtmekte ve bu kavramın işaret ettiği olgusal durumun tanınırlık kuramına dayalı olarak geliştirilecek pratik uygulamalar için değerlendirme çerçevesinin oluşturulmasında bir bilgi kaynağı işlevi görebileceğini belirtmektedir. Üçüncü olarak ise bu çalışma, dezavantajın analizinde tanınma kuramının normatif çerçevesinin değerlendirme alanı ve etik zarar kavramsallaştırmasının da değerlendirme ölçütü olarak ele alındığı uygulamalarda, araştırmacıların dikkat etmesi gereken üç eleştiri kümesine işaret etmekte ve bunları iyinin sınıflandırılması, tanınırlık vaadine ilişkin muğlaklık ve nedenselleştirilemez/temellendirilemez talepler olarak sınıflandırmaktadır. Son olarak bu çalışma, etik zarar kavramsallaştırmasının hali hazırdaki muğlaklığından ve işaret edilen eleştiri kümelerinden hareketle deforme edici kimlik oluşumu, görünmez kılınma ve damgalamayı etik zarar kavramsallaştırmasını tanımlayan unsurlar olarak işaret etmekte ve fiziksel bütünlük, etik sorumluluk ve kişisel bağımsızlık unsurlarına odaklanılarak dezavantaj yaratıcı bu etik zararların analiz edilebileceğini belirtmektedir.

Sınırlılıklar

Bu çalışmanın en önemli sınırlılığı olarak çalışmada önerilen değerlendirme ölçütlerinin tanınma kuramının kuramsal ve kavramsal çerçevesini esas alarak tasarlanmış bir ampirik araştırmaya, örneğin dezavantajlı grup ve bireylerle yapılmış görüşmelerden elde edilen verilerle, dayanmaması olarak işaret edilebilir. Etik zarar kavramsallaştırmasının kısmen yeni bir kavramsallaştırma olması ve henüz bütünüyle netlik kazanmamış olması ilgili literatürde bu kavramı referans alan ampirik uygulamaların sayısının da oldukça sınırlı olarak kalmasını beraberinde getirmektedir. Dolayısıyla, etik zarar kavramsallaştırmasına yönelik kuramsal açıklamalara olduğu kadar, aynı zamanda kavramın netleşmesini sağlayacak pratik uygulama araştırmalarına da ihtiyaç bulunmaktadır. Her ne kadar bu çalışma kuramsal düzeyde etik zarar kavramsallaştırmasına ilişkin çok boyutlu bir tartışmayı ve kavramın pratik uygulamalar için nasıl ele alınması gerektiği konusunda bir öneriyi içerse de ilgili kavramın işaret ettiği olgusal durumun dezavantajlı grup ve bireylerin günlük hayat deneyimlerinde hangi biçimlerde tezahür ettiğine odaklanan ampirik araştırma verileri ile desteklenmesine ihtiyaç duymaktadır.

Öneriler

Yukarıda bahsedilen sınırlılık ile ilişkili olarak, bu çalışma çerçevesinde öne çıkan ilk öneri çalışmanın önerdiği değerlendirme çerçevesinin ampirik verilen ışığında uygulanmasına dönük ihtiyaçtır. Bu çalışma hem dezavantajlılık olgusunu hem de tanınma ihtiyacı ve etik zarar kavramsallaştırmalarını geniş anlamıyla ele almaktadır. Oysa ki dezavantajlılık olgusunun birey ve grupların içinde buldukları sosyal yapının sosyolojik özelliklerine bağlı olarak gösterebileceği farklılaşma ve tanınma kuramı ile etik zarar kavramsallaştırmasının toplumsal cinsiyet, yaş, etnisite ya da sosyal sınıf farklılıklarına bağlı olarak farklı ihtiyaçlar şeklinde tezahür edebileceği göz önüne alınmalıdır. Bu çerçevede, çalışmanın sunduğu kavramsal çerçevenin (örneğin etik zarar olgusunun deforme edici kimlik oluşumu, görünmez kılınma ve damgalama içeren davranış, karar, uygulama ya da siyasalarla tanımlanması) farklı sosyolojik toplumsal gruplar ve bireyler özelinde farklı tezahür etme biçimlerinin görgül veriler ışığında araştırılması ve tartışılması gelecek araştırmalar için faydalı olacaktır. Buna ek olarak, tanınma kuramı çerçevesinde ve etik zarar kavramsallaştırması esas alınarak gerçekleştirilecek bir dezavantaj analizinin sonuçları farklı bilimler alanları tarafından farklı siyasa önerilerini gündeme getirebilir. Örneğin, kuram çerçevesinde gerçekleştirilmiş bir analize dayanarak farklı disiplinler farklı çözüm önerileri sunabilir. Söz konusu çok disiplinliğin yaratacağı düşünümsel zenginlik hem kuramın hem de onun kavramsal çerçevesinin netleşmesine katkı sağlayacaktır.

Özgün Değer

Bu çalışmanın özgün değeri iki başlık altında özetlenebilir. Bunlardan birincisi tanınma kuramının genel olarak sosyal adalet literatürüne ve daha özelde de dağıtıcı adalet kuramlarına getirdiği özgü ve ilişkisel bakış açısıyla ilgilidir. Tanınma kuramı, daha çok birey ve grup özellikleri ve sahipliklerine odaklanılarak değerlendirilen sosyal adalet(sizlik) olgusunu, birey ve grup sahiplikleri ya da özelliklerinden çıkartarak, aktör(lerin) diğer(ler)i ile kurduğu ilişkisellik üzerinden değerlendirmeyi önermekte, bu anlamıyla ilgili literatüre özgün bir bakış açısı sunmaktadır. Öte yandan, çalışmada da vurgulandığı üzere, bu ilişkisel değerlendirme pratiğinin hem değerlendirme alanı ve değerlendirme ölçütleri arasındaki ayrım hem de hangi ele alınacak ölçütlerin neler olması gerektiği konusunda uygulamaya dönük tanımlayıcı ve aydınlatıcı analiz ve açıklamalar ilgili literatürde etraflıca ele alınmamıştır. Bu çalışmanın özgün değerine ilişkin ikinci başlık bu çerçevede ortaya çıkmaktadır. Çalışma, sadece tanınma kuramı ve bu kuramın normatif bakış açısını açıklamakla sınırlı kalmamakta, söz konusu soyut ve aşkın bu bakış açısının (dez)avantajlılık olgusunun analizinde kullanılacak bir değerlendirme çerçevesi olarak seçilmesi durumunda, araştırmacı ve uygulayıcılar için odaklanılması gereken değerlendirme ölçütlerine ilişkin bir öneride de bulunmaktadır.

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