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The Role of Closed Morality in Achieving Rational Communication: The Possibility of Rational Communication Within Bergson's Non-rationalist Morality**

Abstract

Based on Bergson's *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, the paper attempts to investigate the role of closed morality in the achievement of rational communication. The claim is made that closed morality does not only have a destructive side but also a constructive side that may be present in achieving rational communication. Considering Bergson's ideas about the plane of intellectuality, the author intends to find a place for rational communication within Bergson's non-rationalist morality. Founded on the fact that closed morality and open morality are extreme limits and therefore cannot be found in a society in their pure form, the author claims that rational communication can be present in the transition stage between the closed soul and the open soul.

Key Terms

Bergson, closed morality, closed society, open morality, open society, rational communication, human communication.

Akılcı İletişime Ulaşmada Kapalı Ahlakın Rolü: Bergson'un Akılcı-olmayan Ahlakında Akılcı İletişimin Olanaklılığı

Özet

Bu makale Bergson'un *Ahlak ile Dinin İki Kaynağı* adlı eserini temel alarak akılcı iletişime ulaşmada kapalı ahlakın rolünü araştırıyor. Kapalı ahlakın yalnızca yıkıcı bir tarafının değil aynı zamanda yapıcı bir tarafının da olduğu ve bu yapıcı tarafın akılcı iletişime ulaşmada ortaya çıkabileceği savunuluyor. Yazar, Bergson'un zihinsellik düzlemi ile ilgili fikirlerinden yola çıkarak Bergson'un akılcı-olmayan

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ahlakında akılcı iletişime bir yer bulmaya çalışıyor. Kapalı ahlak ve açık ahlakın uç sınırlar olduğu ve dolayısıyla hiçbir toplumda saf halleriyle bulunamayacağı gerçeğinden hareketle yazar akılcı iletişimin kapalı ruh ve açık ruh arasındaki geçiş aşamasında bulunabileceğini iddia ediyor.

Anahtar Terimler

Bergson, kapalı ahlak, kapalı toplum, açık ahlak, açık toplum, akılcı iletişim, insancıl iletişim.

1. Introduction

Based on Henri Bergson's *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, I try to show how rational communication within Bergson's non-rationalist morality is possible and I attempt to investigate the role of closed morality in achieving rational communication. Bergson's morality is not rationalist. He did not concern himself with how to establish morality rationally. He rather aimed to show the original tendencies leading towards the formation of closed morality and open morality. He tried to show that "obligation" on the one hand and "love", on the other hand is force, tendency or manifestation of life. His distinction between the two moralities is not rational but biological. However, there is an important place for intelligence in Bergson's morality that cannot be denied. Considering Bergson's ideas about the plane of intellectuality, I therefore intend to find a place for rational communication within Bergson's non-rationalist morality. Founded on the fact that closed morality and open morality are extreme limits and therefore cannot be found in a society in their pure form, I claim that rational communication can be present in the transition stage between the closed soul and the open soul. I also claim that closed morality does not only have a destructive side but also a constructive side that may be present in achieving rational communication.

2. Definition of Closed Morality and Closed Society

Closed morality, can be defined in Bergson's philosophy as "the principles or rules of behavior based on right and wrong that members of a group of people *impose* on each other in order to preserve social conventions valid for themselves." It is the morality of pressure. It is, as Mullarkey defines, "a set of rules and balances, pressures and obligations bearing down on the individual, homogenizing him or her by removing his or her evolutionary alterity" (2000: 94-95). Based on such morality, individuals adapt themselves to the human milieu in which they live—whether in a small society or society at large, a community. The main features of closed morality can be listed as follows: 1) Primacy given to society's rules, norms, value judgments and social conventions 2) Preservation of these rules, norms, value judgments and social conventions 3) Concealment of individuality 4) Its rules, norms, value judgments and social conventions not being universally valid.

Bergson compares "social order" with "natural order". Pointing out to the nature of human beings, he recognizes *imperative character* in relation to the social order

consisting of rigid social habits similar to the laws of nature of the natural order. These habits, reflected in our customs for example, are imposed on each individual through the pressure of other individuals of the society. Bergson makes the reason explicit:

If physical law tends to assume in our imagination the form of a command when it attains to a certain degree of generality, in its turn an imperative which applies to everybody appears to us somewhat like a law of nature. The two ideas, coming against each other in our minds, effect an exchange. The law borrows from the command its prerogative of compulsion; the command receives from the law its inevitability. Thus a breach of the social order assumes an anti-natural character; even when frequently repeated, it strikes us as an exception, being to society what a freak creation is to nature (1935: 12-13).

Closed morality is in fact morality of command that does not allow questioning. We do not question the fact that there *are* laws of nature. Similarly, individuals sustaining closed morality do not question the form and content of the social laws. These individuals belong to a social order that excludes the one who questions it. This state of not questioning is yet another feature of closed morality that can be derived from the list of features given above.

Closed society, in turn, has to be defined in Bergson's philosophy in relation to closed morality. In fact, any society that sustains closed morality is called a closed society. Closed society is a system of deeply rooted habits of command and obedience coming from the individuals' feeling of obligation (Bergson 1935: 10). "The closed society is that whose members hold together, caring nothing for the rest of humanity, on the alert for attack or defence, bound, in fact, to a perpetual readiness for battle. Such is human society fresh from the hands of nature. Man was made for this society, as the ant was made for the ant-heap" (a.e., 266). Closed society is "a tendency to constitute and preserve itself as a relatively fixed identity, turned in upon itself and distinct from an outside" (Power, 2003: 69).

3. The Place of Intelligence in Bergson's Non-rationalist/ Evolutionary Morality

Bergson's morality is not rationalist. He did not concern himself with how to establish morality rationally. He rather aimed to show the sources of morality—two moralities—the original tendencies leading towards the formation of moralities. He tried to show that "obligation" on the one hand and "love", on the other hand is force, tendency or manifestation of life. His distinction between the two moralities is not rational but *biological*.¹ However, there is an important place for *intelligence* in

¹ It has to be added that commentators like John Mullarkey interpreted the distinction as "sociobiological". See *Bergson and Philosophy*. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000, p. 88-103. I prefer using the term "biological" instead since the term "sociobiology" was first used by John Paul Scott in 1946 at a conference and became widely used in the late 20th century.

Bergson's morality that cannot be denied. Taking Popper's criticism of Bergson into account we shall now proceed on to determine the place of intelligence in Bergson's non-rationalist morality and explain Bergson's biological distinction between the two moralities.

Popper had criticized Bergson by claiming that Bergson's distinction between closed and open morality is not a rationalist but a religious distinction. He said that his own distinction is based on the idea that open societies are those societies in which people *learn to criticize* and *take decisions* based on their intelligence. He differentiated his distinction by interpreting that of Bergson by *excluding* the place for intelligence (Popper 1996: 202). However, a closer examination of Bergson's distinction will show that intelligence has a role in Bergson's non-rationalist morality. Bergson makes the role of intelligence explicit in various places of *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*:

Our languages are the product of custom. Nothing in the vocabulary, or even in the syntax, comes from nature. But speech is natural, and unvarying signs, natural in origin, which are presumably used in a community of insects, exhibit what our language would have been, if nature in bestowing on us the faculty of speech had not added that function which, since it makes and uses tools, is inventive and called intelligence. We must perpetually recur to what obligation would have been if human society had been instinctive instead of intelligent (1935: 28).

Man, fresh from the hands of nature, was a being both intelligent and social, his sociability being devised to find its scope in small communities, his intelligence being designed to further individual and group life. But intelligence, expanding through its own efforts, has developed unexpectedly. It has freed men from restrictions to which they were condemned by the limitations of their nature" (a.e., 57).

Although Bergson tried to show (since his work *Time and Free Will: An Essay on The Immediate Data of Consciousness*) the negative side of language that is to distort reality because of the use of symbols, it has to be admitted that language also has a positive side: it is formed through intelligence and without intelligence *communication* among individuals would not have been possible. Human society is an intelligent organization in contrast to some other societies like the society of ants.

The fact that Bergson's morality is non-rationalist does not exclude the idea that intelligence has a role—even an important role—in morality: 1) intelligence makes communication possible 2) intelligence enabled man to free himself from the limitations of nature. Popper's criticism that Bergson's distinction excludes intelligence does not hold. Bergson would agree with Popper that individuals of open societies criticize and take decisions. On the other hand, the point where Bergson differs from Popper is that *openness* for Bergson requires *more than* criticizing and taking decisions. Intelligence by itself does not suffice in bringing out the essential in open morality. The essential and the distinction should be found in a biology based on evolution. Although the

distinction between the two moralities is not rationalist and Popper is right in that, nor it is religious.

Bergson's distinction between closed and open morality rests on two *movements*: "the movement of exclusion" or "hatred" and "the movement of openness" or "love" (Mullarkey, 2000: 122). These two *movements* constitute the sources of two moralities that are embodied as "pressure" and "aspiration". Bergson says, "all morality, be it pressure or aspiration, is in essence biological" (1935: 101). He also replaces "natural essences" with "natural tendencies". Owing to Bergson's *evolutionary morality*, the *movement* of exclusion and openness should be understood not in terms of natural essences but in terms of natural tendencies: social forms are not given, they are in an ongoing creation. Any attempt in understanding society by means of natural essences would be a mistake (Mullarkey 2000: 89).

The 'sources' of society only provide us with natural tendencies, one of which will actually be the tendency to renounce all notions of natural essence in favour of the continual creation of new social forms—what Bergson will dub 'open morality' (...) Society is indeed moulded by nature, but by a creative nature which in part tries to break its own moulds (a.e.).

Both moral obligation and moral aspiration are understood within life's creative evolution. Moral obligation refers to "the evolved" whereas moral aspiration refers to "the evolving".

The first acts as a type of pressure, a centripetal movement of closure, fostering a closed model of society (or association) and a static form of religion. The second is an outward, dissociative and centrifugal movement, bearing within it the seeds of open sociability, and dynamic spirituality (a.e., 92).

It would be accurate to claim that the *distinction itself* between the two moralities is not religious but is biological whereas the *outcome* of life's creative movements is moral and religious.²

Bergson says that nature has created the conditions for human beings to be social, to necessarily have social lives. Obligation plays an important role in this respect: it ties people to one another (1935: 8-9). The obligation of closed societies is tantamount to a pressure which is the work of nature (a.e., 267) (the centripetal movement of closure). Nature created the conditions for human beings to live as social groups and the formation of moral law in closed morality is given to us by nature. Moral law according to Bergson, "prevents society from falling apart and it is obviously necessary for guaranteeing social cohesion. It persists in the social ego, a part of our consciousness which is impersonal but none the less makes up an aspect of ourselves. Thus when we fail to conform to its orders, we feel separated not only from other

² The relation between morality and religion will be dealt in the section "Rational communication and Human communication".

people but from ourselves as well” (Kolakowski 2001: 74-75). The individual will feel the pressure of the moral law even though she tries to violate or escape from it because the moral law persists in her consciousness and the individual self and the social self are almost united. The individual needs obligation in order to survive in society, because only then she feels she is a part of it. Obligation arises from the individual’s natural need to belong to society.

“The natural system of moral obligations is designed to serve the particular society in which it is binding” (Kolakowski 2001: 75). That is the reason why that system *cannot extend* to humanity. It is a closed system. It is closed to outsiders, to foreigners and moreover “natural social bonds are formed against foreign societies” for self-defense and “resulting war is a work of nature” (a.e.). Social rules in closed morality are formed by turning moral value judgments of the society into judgments that are to be obeyed. It is these rules that guide the behavior of individuals. I name any behavior that comes from the way of acting in accordance with closed morality as *closed behavior*. To conform, in the sense of obedience, to the rules established in a particular society is an ensemble of closed behavior manifesting what is good and bad or right and wrong for that society. In this respect, a closed behavior is a behavior that is prescribed by social rules or conventions. Since closed morality wishes to preserve social conventions, by the same token it wishes to preserve closed behavior.

By conforming to the particular rules of our society we exhibit closed behavior. Any action and thought in accordance with established rules is conformity. If the established social rules are the rules peculiar to and valid only for a particular society, this conformity does not have a universal character. This conformity is not the conformity of human morality that embraces all mankind. In other words, it is the conformity peculiar to closed morality. Such conformity assumes the universality of moral law when in fact it can assume nothing more than a generality of moral law, general in the sense of comprising a community.

4. Rational Communication and Human Communication

We need to mention that although Bergson explains the characteristics of each morality, these are only “ideal limits”, “extreme limits” and cannot be found in a society in its pure form. There is not and can never be a completely open morality/society, just like there never has been a completely closed morality/society.³ “The forces of openness and closure are present in varying degrees in every society.” Therefore in “actual morality”, we find both “a system of orders dictated” and “a series of appeals”, they are the manifestations of life that complement each other (Mullarkey 2000: 95-96).

³ Antoine Hatzenberger, in his article “Open Society and Bolos: A Utopian Reading of Bergson’s ‘Final Remarks’” interpreted Bergson’s ‘open society’ as a utopia. According to him, Bergson’s “two ideal communities...adopt the general aims of utopias.” However, ‘open society’ is not a pure abstraction. The term ‘utopia’ in this article is used in the sense of a motive that propels life forward. Hatzenberger says that Bergson’s use of the term ‘utopia’ is “a critical approach to classical utopia” and “a demonstration of the conditions of realizability of utopia (by contributing to the concretization of utopia).” See *Culture and Organization*, 2003, Vol 9 (1), March, p. 44-45.

Any society is closed in the sense that it embodies a certain degree of closure. However, the fact that we all come from different cultures and that every society retains a degree of closure does not imply that we cannot communicate, that we cannot have an open and honest dialogue with each other. As long as we have a *desire*⁴ to *communicate*, we can reach out to each other and even reach agreement about certain value judgments that seem to be culturally incommensurable at the outset. In order to achieve this, we should speak to others honestly and openly. Why? Why should we do this? There are people from different cultures that we cannot bear, that we don't want to communicate with, and we close ourselves to them. So why should we try to have an open dialogue with these people we cannot bear? Why should we try to achieve *rational communication*?

We can find an answer to this question within Bergson's philosophy if we reflect on our human nature (in the sense of natural tendencies). Our social nature serves to tighten the social bonds of the society that we are members of. However, the social bonds are formed in a way to be used for self-defense, when and where necessary. On the other hand, due to "the desire to be open towards openness: a welcome owed to those who are themselves 'opening' (a.e., 95), we also have a natural tendency to embrace the whole mankind with "love". This recognition of the human nature constitutes at the same time the leap to open morality, that is, universal morality. According to Bergson, "the closed soul can evolve into an open one—not by broadening its field of bonds with other people, but by acquiring another, truly human nature. It takes a creative emotion to open oneself to mankind and to abandon the way of life in which we are capable of loving some people only by hating others" (Kolakowski 2001: 76).

In Bergson's philosophy, morality is closely connected with religion. The movement of closure leads not only to closed morality/society but also to static religion whereas the movement of openness propels life forward both to open morality/society and dynamic religion in which we are liberated "from the ties of our own special community" by means of a call to all humanity (Matthews 1996: 37). Some "great moral leaders, saints or heroes" that were capable of "drawing the masses after them" (1935: 34) were needed to enable people acquire a human nature which is the love of mankind. That is the reason why Bergson claimed that "the leap to a morality which embraces the entire human race cannot be performed without religious inspiration" (Kolakowski 2001: 76). He asks the question "what is specifically religious in religion?" and answers it by saying that religion is essentially a certain state of soul that can be propagated (1935: 268). The outstanding personalities, the great mystics are able to propagate this state of soul. They do not impose pressure on individuals. "They appeal to all, they find followers, and thus they prove that in our soul there is a potential force that goes beyond the tribal mentality toward human fraternity" (Kolakowski 2001: 76). We are attracted to these moral figures; we take them as models because they enable us to acquire a human nature. Although the source of embracing the whole

⁴ According to John Mullarkey, "desire" is a very important term ("the key") of open morality, it is that which "can be universalist and creative," it is that which is above reason and intelligence. See *Bergson and Philosophy*. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000, p. 99.

mankind with love is biological and that life imparted this gift of loving all to exceptional individuals (1935: 100), nevertheless, every individual can learn to place him/herself in life's creative evolution by taking these already "open" individuals as models. Therefore, for those who are not specially gifted with creative energy, it takes effort to acquire "openness", a genuine human nature. When we acquire a human nature by means of spiritual aspiration, we will *naturally desire* to have genuine, open and honest dialogue with people from different cultures. We will no longer see this as an obligation for establishing world peace and we will no longer ask the question "why should we try to achieve communication among cultures?" This is more than rational communication, it is *human communication: a communication based on love*. Rational communication is *the means* for different cultures to find the way to live together in peace whereas human communication is *the result* of acquiring a truly human nature. Rational communication is based on intelligence/reason whereas human communication is based on religious inspiration.⁵ Bergson says,

It is only through God, and in God that religion invites man to love humankind, just as it is only through reason and in reason that we all live in communion; through and in reason philosophers let us see humanity, show us the eminent dignity of the human person and everyone's right to others' respect (1935: 33).

It is then possible to see humanity by means of reason. When reason guides us, we are able to communicate with each other about human rights, equality, justice, respect for people, and the like. This is the way of reason. We all live in communities and have no other way than interacting with each other on rational grounds. Even those of us who, by the effort they make, would like to open up their soul, have to interact with people on rational grounds. The same holds for the communication between different communities and cultures. In trying to take common decisions about the matters concerning nations, for example, arriving at consensus is possible only on rational grounds, and not on a spiritual ground.

Rational communication is the *transitional stage* between self-defense and human communication, between closed soul and open soul. Bergson states,

⁵ Besides rational communication and human communication, it is possible to talk about "aesthetic communication" within Bergson's philosophy that is especially elaborated in Bergson's *Laughter*. It is also possible to find some similarities between artists and mystics. "Dans ces textes, extraits du *Rire* ou des *Deux Sources*, les termes qui se rapportent aux artistes et ceux qui ont trait aux mystiques sont interchangeable. Visiblement, Bergson les rencontre sur la voie d'une réalité identique" says Raymond Christoflour in "Bergson et La Conception Mystique de L'art." *Henri Bergson. Essais et Témoignages Recueillis par Albert Béguin et Pierre Thévenaz*. Éditions de la Baconnière. Neuchatel, 1943, p. 159 and "Bergson insists that the source of both aesthetic and moral invention is a creative emotion that, in its propagation from person to person, constitutes a veritable ontological milieu in which people can live—or, rather, become—together" says Carl Power in "Freedom and Sociability for Bergson." *Culture and Organization* vol. 9 (1), March 2003, p. 70. Human communication I am referring to here is closer to aesthetic communication in the sense that it surpasses intelligence.

Between the closed soul and the open soul there is the soul in process of opening. Between the immobility of a man seated and the motion of the same man running there is the act of getting up, the attitude he assumes when he rises. In a word, between the static and the dynamic there is to be observed, in morality too, a transition stage” (a.e., 63-64).

Rational communication can be found in this act of getting up in the way of opening of the soul because in this process of opening, intelligence intervenes. In both kinds of morality, there is obligation. However, the obligation of closed morality, “in so far as it is a pressure, is infra-rational” or “infra-intellectual” whereas the obligation of open morality, “in so far as it is aspiration, is supra-rational” or “supra-intellectual” (a.e., 269). The obligation of open morality is a command, “the command to ‘love all’ ” (Mullarkey 2000: 95). Closed morality unfolds in something less than intelligence because it consists of a whole group of habits which is “the counterpart of certain instincts in animals.” Open morality, on the other hand, though it contains an “amount of intellectuality,” unfolds in something more than intelligence because it is “inspiration, intuition, emotion.” And between infra-intellectual and supra-intellectual, there is intelligence itself (1935: 64). The act of getting up is to rise up to “the plane of intellectuality” (a.e) in which reasons “put forward reasons,” that is, reasons are opposed again with reasons, in which moral ideas like equality and justice are extended from the most primitive form of barter to the “intercourse between persons” and in which we still feel the pressure of our present society. Here, we are in the transitional stage of finding out the ways of communicating with others despite the present pressure. Behind the scene of those who try to achieve rational communication, “behind reason”, there are “the men who have made mankind divine, and who have thus stamped a divine character on reason, which is the essential attribute of man. It is these men who draw us towards an ideal society, while we yield to the pressure of the real one” (a.e., 68-69). However, this is not a passive draw. Bergson says, “there is no fatality in history. The future will be what we want it to be.”⁶ We do not simply wait some people to draw us towards an ideal, open society. We should get up, we should rise: we have to make effort in order to open up our soul. How can the love of all, fraternity be achieved without the achievement of rational communication? Is it possible to love mankind without any communicative interaction? The act of getting up in the way of the opening of the soul requires communicating with others. We should speak to others, discuss, criticize and take decisions with others in order to get ready to acquire a genuine human nature by means of spiritual aspiration that will differ in kind from social nature.

5. Closed Morality’s Constructive Side in Achieving Rational Communication

Our soul in process of opening can find ways to use closed morality’s constituents in favor of communication. Since closed morality is the work of nature, it is

⁶ Bergson (1972) *Mélanges*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, p. 1538, quoted by Antoine Hatzenberger, “Open Society and Bolos: A Utopian Reading of Bergson’s ‘Final Remarks’”, *Culture and Organization*, 2003, Vol 9 (1), March, p. 43-58.

not possible to annihilate it. As I said before, every society retains and will continue to retain a certain degree of closure. Closed morality is one of the directions society is pulled in. Mullarkey states that “society is pulled in two opposed directions: inward, by the tendency to consolidate what identity it has, to revolve in a circle, to repeat, and outward, by the tendency to destroy its own identity, to evolve new heterogeneous forms of social arrangement, to create” (2000: 97). It is only by communicating with others that one’s own identity can be destroyed and evolve towards new social arrangements. Although closed morality does not disappear in the way of the opening of the soul; it is—as Bergson uses the word—“absorbed” (1935: 35) by open morality. Therefore, closed morality is inherent in open morality in a new form. In this new form, closed morality’s “imperative character” is *lent to* open morality (a.e., 50-51). “Bergson believed that it was the destiny of mankind to move closer and closer to the ‘open society’ in which wars will have been done away with, and where democratic values and respect for human rights would prevail” (Kolakowski 2001: 84-85). Bergson defined open society as “the society which is deemed in principle to embrace all humanity” (1935: 267). Closed morality is a morality that can either result in war in one extreme or contribute to the achievement of rational communication in its new form gained through intelligence. This means that the constituents of closed morality can both be destructive and constructive. Hatzemberger, for example, says that “society represents the most complete form of development, but must be defended against uncontrolled industrialization, if it is to evolve from closure towards openness” (2003). On the one hand, intelligence, uncontrolled, can cause unpleasant and harmful results to all humanity. Today’s many social problems are the proof of this. On the other hand, intelligence can also be used *in favor of openness*. The constructive side of closed morality is the new form in which intelligence employs the imperative character of closed morality in contributing to the achievement of communication. Therefore, closed morality’s constituents cannot only be considered as destructive, they can also be considered from a constructive point of view. In the transitional stage of the opening of the soul, closedness can be and should be used in favor of rational communication.

Members of a closed society get used to conforming to the rules of their society through the pressure each individual exercises on the other. This is the inward movement causing societies to retain their identity. I believe that this closed behavior can be used in decisively desiring to achieve communication with different cultures. If societies did not retain a certain degree of closure, it would have been impossible for a society to retain its identity, to enable the bonds of its individuals to persist. If the society consolidates its identity by precluding its social bonds being formed against foreign societies for self-defense, then the destructive side of closed morality can be transformed and contribute to achieving communication.⁷ The “imperative character” or

⁷ Arguing against nationalism and therefore against closed mentality, Popper defended a strong individualism on rational grounds. Although Popper has very great ideas that I do share, I believe that he interpreted closedness only in its destructive aspect and couldn’t see any positive value that can come out of it. Talking about the identity of a society, for example, does not necessarily lead to open the way for nationalist discourse. Andrew Vincent, in his recent article “Nationalism and The Open Society” said that one of Popper’s lines of criticism against nationalism is that “for Popper, no one seems to be able to explain precisely what a nation is, empirically or historically” (see *Theoria: A Journal of Social & Political Theory*,

“the compulsive force” of closed morality handed on to open morality can be preserved in the new form of determination to achieve communication. In other words, the pressure that guaranteed social cohesion, can be transformed into a determination. I have mentioned as a feature of closed morality the concealment of individuality in favor of society. I have also mentioned Kolakowski’s remark about closed morality that the failure to conform to the orders of the moral law results in feeling separated not only from other people but also from ourselves. This means that the pressure (of closed morality) is not only imposed on us by others but that we ourselves impose pressure on ourselves. I believe that this self-imposed pressure can engender a decisive desire to achieve communication. Another feature of closed morality that arose from pressure was the preservation of social conventions. Successful communication among cultures does not require societies to give up their own conventions that represent their own identity. On the contrary, they should be clear in expressing their own moral value judgments in order to conform to a basis for successful communication. Nobody would expect the realization of communication by means of societies renouncing their own moral values. In some circumstances we are open for change but in many cases we are insistent in preserving our own moral values. As we are insistent in preserving our moral values, we can also be insistent in being determined to communicate with each other and thus use our closed behavior in favor of openness. This is at the same time the meaning of conformity broadened: in other words, conformity in this broadened and positive sense, is the name given to action and thought in accordance with the value of being determined and insistent to achieve communication among people and cultures. As I use them, ‘being determined’ describes a general attitude and ‘being insistent’ emphasizes action that will take place. This conformity is the conformity of human morality that embraces all humanity. It is the conformity peculiar to those who are in the way of opening up their souls, of those who are eager to have dialogue with people. In this process of dialogue, social self confined with the particular culture it belongs to, is broadened to other cultures by affecting them and being affected by them. Therefore, the unity of the individual and social self peculiar to closed morality has a constructive side: if the individual succeeds in identifying himself with the world as he naturally identified himself with the society he lives in, then the unity of the individual and social self peculiar to closed morality will be transformed into the unity of the individual and the global self: that is, the expansion of social self into a greater unity.

6. Concluding Remarks

Based on the fact that every society retains and will continue to retain a degree of closure, the society in which individuals transform their closed behavior in favor of achieving communication can be the definition of *open society* based on the constructive side of closed morality. In other words, I believe that open societies are

Aug 2005 Issue 107, p. 36-64). Here, Popper’s criticism is based again on rational grounds. Looked within Bergson’s philosophy, one can find an answer to Popper’s question: the movement of closure is one of life’s manifestations according to which people come together to form communities, societies. This movement leads people to form different cultures and generate bonds that bind them. Therefore, when people talk about nations, they mean this existing bond among individuals.

those societies in which individuals try to create constructive value out of their closed behavior. They are able to transform the destructive aspect of closed morality into its constructive aspect. They are those individuals who do not impose their own values to other cultures but instead can take action in accordance with the determined and insistent desire to achieve rational communication between cultures. They are ready to enlarge their social self in interaction with other societies.

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